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RESTORATION OF WETLANDS UNDER SECTION 404 
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT: AN ANALYTICAL 
SYNTHESIS OF STATUTORY AND CASE LAW 
PRINCIPLES 
Mark C. Rouvalis* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments (FWPCAA)1 in 1972, the federal government has come 
to appreciate wetlands as important natural resources that deserve 
* Articles Editor, 1987-88, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author wishes to thank Professor Zygmunt Plater, Raymond Hiley, RuthAnn Sherman, 
Karen Liepmann, Robert Orsi, David Rocchio, and Cynthia Rouvalis for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions. Any errors which remain are attributable to the author. 
1 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376). When 
Congress adopted new amendments in 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), the 
legislative body referred to the statute by its more popularly known name, the Clean Water 
Act ("CWA" or "the Act"). This Comment will refer to the water pollution control statute as 
the CWA or the Act, except where specific reference to the 1972 FWPCAA is required. For 
more on the legislative history of the Act, see infra, text accompanying notes 41-82. 
The Act applies to all of the nation's navigable waters, which it defines as "waters of the 
United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). In providing such a 
broad definition of navigable waters, Congress intended to expand the legal definition from 
one which required essentially navigability-in-fact to one which would be given the "broadest 
possible constitutional interpretation." S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, 
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3776,3822; H.R. REP. No. 911, 92nd Cong., 
2nd Sess. 131, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 131 (microfiche no. H643-
3) (1972); see also, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 
686 (D.D.C. 1975) (Army Corps of Engineers regulation defining navigable waters struck 
down as too narrow); United States V. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974) 
(Congress defined away the old test of navigability in the 1972 amendments); see generally 
Note, Wetlands' Reluctant Champion: The Corps Takes a Fresh Look at "Navigable Waters," 
6 ENVTL. L. 217 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Wetlands Reluctant Champion]; but cf. Currin, 
Clean Water Act Section 404 Jurisdiction: Mandate for Reform, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 825 (1982). 
Consequently, the Army Corps of Engineers has interpreted the phrase "waters ofthe United 
States" to include many types of wetlands. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2), (3), (7) (1987). 
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preservation and protection. This appreciation stems from the gov-
ernment's and the general public's growing awareness that wetlands 
playa vital role in the nation's ecosystem. The Army Corps of 
Engineers (ACOE), the federal agency charged with protecting the 
nation's wetlands, defines wetlands as "those areas that are inun-
dated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and 
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances 
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in 
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, 
marshes, bogs and similar areas."2 Among their many significant 
environmental functions, 3 wetlands are an essential link in the food 
chain,4 purify and store storm and flood waters,5 and serve as a 
general habitat for aquatic and land species, many of which are 
endangered. 6 Additionally, wetlands also contribute significantly to 
the nation's economy. The nation's annual commercial harvest of 
wetland-dependent fish species has an approximate worth of seven 
to eight billion dollars. 7 Recreationally, wetlands generate for the 
economy hundreds of millions of dollars each year from the purchases 
of hunters and trappers.8 Wetlands also save the public from making 
certain expenditures. For example, wetlands store storm waters, 
thereby preventing flood damage in the amount of several thousand 
dollars per wetland acre.9 Because wetlands constitute a "productive 
2 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a)(7)(b) (1987). The Supreme Court has recently upheld the constitu-
tionality of the definition. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 
139 (1985). In reversing the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, a unanimous Court in Riverside 
determined that a narrow interpretation of the definition was not necessary so as to prevent 
the occurrence of an unconstitutional taking. Id. at 128. Equally important, however, the 
Court found that Congress in 1977 had rejected attempts to curb the scope of the ACOE's 
jurisdiction over wetlands under the Clean Water Act by redefining the term navigable waters. 
Id. at 135--37. Congress apparently was concerned that a narrower definition of waters of the 
United States would not protect wetlands adequately. Id. at 137. 
3 Wetlands also function as sanctuaries for environmental study; affect current patterns, 
salinity distribution, and flushing characteristics; shield other areas from erosion or storm 
damage; and act as prime natural recharge areas, locations where surface and groundwater 
have a direct connection. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(ii-iv), (vi) (1987). 
4 E. HORWITZ, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS 19-21 (1978). 
5Id. at 22-28. 
6 J. KUSLER, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND HERITAGE, 3 (1983). 
7 Possible Amendments to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 1982: Hearings before the 
Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. _(1982), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1319, 
1337 (microfiche no. H641-15) (1982) (statement of Thomas G. Tomasello, representing the 
National Wildlife Federation). 
8Id. at 1335. 
9Id. at 1338. 
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and valuable public resource," the government's policy holds that 
their "unnecessary alteration or destruction ... should be discour-
aged as contrary to the public interest. "10 This policy creates a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of wetlands protection which those 
who want to alter wetlands must overcome before developing a 
wetlands area. 11 
The government's and public's appreciation, however, developed 
while human activity destroyed approximately fifty-four percent of 
the country's original wetland area. 12 In addition to their important 
environmental features, wetlands also possess characteristics that 
make them attractive areas for commercial and residential devel-
opment. For example, farmers frequently convert wetlands into 
agricultural land because of the rich, fertile soil wetlands contain. 13 
In fact, approximately eighty percent of wetlands losses result from 
agricultural conversion. 14 Real estate developers also value wetlands 
because the marketplace frequently underprices them relative to dry 
land as building sites. 15 Additionally, because wetlands are often 
located near other bodies of water, the waterview enhances the 
scenic value of residences built there. 16 The tension created by the 
10 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b) (1987) (ACOE's general policies for evaluating permit applications 
to discharge dredge or fill materials into waters of the United States). 
11 See also 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1987) (EPA § 404(b)(1) guidelines for permit issuance) 
(except as provided in § 404(b)(2), no discharge shall be permitted if there is practicable 
alternative which would have less environmentally adverse impact); Parish & Morgan, History, 
Practice and Emerging Problems of Wetlands Regulation: Reconsidering Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act, 17 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 43, 63 (1982). The ACOE has not been 
unnecessarily aggressive in promoting the national policy, however. Of the 10,000 permit 
applications it received in 1981, the ACOE denied only three percent. The ACOE approved 
one-third of the permits subject to conditions requiring the applicant to reduce the negative 
effect of the project on the wetlands. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION at 143-44 (1984) reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL 
INFORMATION SERVICE 143-44 (microfiche no. J952-15) (1984) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. For 
criticism of the ACOE's role, or lack of it, in wetlands protection, see Note, Wetlands Protec-
tion and the Neglected Child of the Clean Water Act: A Proposal for Shared Custody of 
Section 404,5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 227 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Wetlands Protection]; 
Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503 (1977). 
12 U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE STUDY, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CUR-
RENT STATUS AND TRENDS vii (1984). The United States continues to lose wetlands at a rate 
of approximately 300,000 acres per year. OTA REPORT, supra note 11, at 11. 
13 OTA REPORT, supra note 11, at 87. 
14Id. at 7. 
15 Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water? The Controversy Over Section 404, Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 491, n.126 
(1977) [hereinafter Caplin, Is Congress Protecting our Water?]. 
16 OTA REPORT, supra note 11, at 8. 
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competing values associated with the protection and preservation of 
wetlands and their development raises important questions about 
the government's wetlands policy and its enforcement. 
The primary vehicle by which the federal government protects 
wetlands areas is section 40417 of the Clean Water Act. 18 This section 
holds that the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of 
Engineers, may, in his discretion, issue permits for "the discharge 
of dredged or fill materials into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites."19 With few exceptions, the Act as a whole and section 
404 in particular flatly prohibit permitless discharges of pollutants20 
into the navigable waters.21 The Act also authorizes the Administra-
tor of the Environmental Protection Agency to deny or restrict the 
use of any defined area as a disposal site if such a discharge will 
have an "unacceptable adverse effect ~m municipal water supplies, 
shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding 
areas), wildlife, or recreational areas."22 
To enforce section 404, the government frequently requests that 
courts order violators-those people who have discharged dredged 
or fill materials without first obtaining a permit or who have dis-
charged such materials in violation of a permit's limitations or 
conditions23-to restore wetlands to their pre-violation condition. 24 
17 Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86 Stat. 884 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1344(aHt) (West Supp. 1987)). Congress probably did not intend § 404 to act as a wetlands 
protector when it passed the FWPCAA in 1972. For more on the congressional intent and 
legislative history of § 404, see infra, text accompanying notes 41-82. 
18 Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the Clean Water Act Before the Subcomm. on 
Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. _(1985), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1 (microfiche 
no. S321-5) (1986) (statement of Senator John Chafee, Chairman of the Subcommittee) (section 
404 is government's most important wetlands protection tool). 
19 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982). 
20 The Act broadly defines pollutant as "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, 
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive 
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, mu-
nicipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982). 
21 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). Activities which fall under the narrowly construed exemptions 
to § 404 are not required to have permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0 (1982). 
22 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1982). The statute in this way contemplates that the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency will retain veto power over the actions of the ACOE, 
which is responsible for the initial evaluation of permits. Such veto action rarely occurs, 
however. Note, Wetlands Protection, supra note 11, at 247-48. 
23 33 U. S. C. § 13l9(a)(3) (1982). 
24 The government has obtained restoration orders in numerous cases. See, e.g., United 
States v. Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. 116 (D. N.J. 1984), afi'd memo 772 F.2d 893 (3rd Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied 475 U.S. 1014 (1986) (defendants ordered to submit restoration plan in accordance 
with government guidelines; implementation of plan and civil penalties stayed pending appli-
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The Act's enforcement provisions, while not specifically mentioning 
restoration as a possible remedy,25 do allow courts to issue a per-
manent or temporary injunction in civil actions when government 
attorneys request that relief. 26 The enforcement section of the Act 
relies upon the federal courts' powers in equity to restrain violations 
and to require compliance with the law. 27 
This Comment will examine the various considerations that the 
courts weigh in determining whether to order restoration as a rem-
edy for violations of section 404. In general, courts have followed a 
traditional equitable balancing process in deciding whether a resto-
ration order should issue. More specifically, many courts have 
cation for discharge permit and preparation of adequate restoration plan); United States v. 
Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 626-27 (E.D. Va. 1983) aff'd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on 
other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987) (defendant ordered to restore some lots of mobile home 
development); United States v. Conrad, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20532, 20533 
(March 23, 1983) (defendant required to restore twenty-three acres of wetlands and to pay 
$100,000 civil penalty or to deed 200 acre parcel of land to be kept in its natural state in 
perpetuity). As evidenced by these three cases and others in which the court has granted to 
the government its requested relief, the restoration ordered may be total, United States v. 
Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd memo 632 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1980), partial, 
Tull, supra, or combined with mitigation damages, Conrad, supra, or civil penalties, Tull, 
107 S. Ct. 1830-31 (defendant has a right to jury trial as to the liability for civil penalties but 
not as to the amount of them); Ciampitti; Conrad, supra. Of course, courts may deny the 
request for restoration altogether. United States V. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 823 (9th Cir.) 
(affirming decision to deny restoration request and to enjoin filling and dredging of wetlands 
unless defendant obtained permit), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 107 (1986); United States V. Tilton, 
705 F.2d 429, 430-31 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). 
25 See text accompanying notes 83-117 for a discussion of the genesis of courts' authority 
to order restoration under the Act. 
26 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982). The statute also provides for civil penalties of up to $25,000 
per day of violation, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) and for criminal penalties which, for convictions of 
second offenders, could mean up to two years in jailor a fine of $50,000 per day of violation 
or both. Id. § 1319(c). Under 33 U.S.C. § 1344(s), the ACOE may bring civil actions for 
violations of permits issued pursuant to § 404. 
The 1987 CWA reauthorization bill amended the enforcement section to allow for adminis-
trative penalties to be issued by either the EPA Administrator or the Secretary of the Army. 
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(g) (West Supp. 1987). The Administrator or Secretary may assess pen-
alties in an amount ranging from $10,000 per violation to a maximum of $25,000 for a Class I 
penalty, or to a maximum of $125,000 for a Class II penalty. Id. § 1319(g)(2)(A), (B). Due to 
these limitations, the administrative penalties amendment to the enforcement section seems 
designed to punish smaller violators for statutory transgressions that would not otherwise be 
worth the government's court time and effort required for prosecution. 
If the Administrator or Secretary chooses to pursue the administrative penalty option, he 
will be precluded from bringing a civil action for civil penalties for the same violation. I d. 
§ 1319(g)(6)(A). The new subsection does not, however, preclude the government from bring-
ing an enforcement action seeking injunctive relief (for example, an action for restoration) for 
the same violation. H.R. REP. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. _(1986), reprinted in 
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 133 (microfiche no. H643-12) (1986). 
27 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318 (1982). 
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adopted the three broad standards articulated by the district court 
in United States v. Weisman. 28 In Weisman, the court held that 
restoration should be ordered if the proposed plan: 1) confers max-
imum environmental benefits; 2) is achievable as a practical matter; 
and 3) bears an equitable relationship to the degree and kind of 
wrong that the restoration plan intends to remedy.29 These three 
considerations allow courts great leeway in deciding whether a res-
toration injunction is appropriate. 
This Comment proposes that the traditional equitable balancing 
process exemplified by the Weisman test is insufficient to effectuate 
the purposes of and promote the public interest embodied in the 
Clean Water Act. The purposes and interests of the Clean Water 
Act include not only the prevention of the unauthorized discharge of 
pollutants into the waters of the United States,30 but also, and 
equally important, the restoration of these waters to their natural 
chemical, physical and biological state.31 In light of the Act's intent, 
a court's decision whether to order restoration for section 404 vio-
lations should give the greatest weight to statutory purposes and 
environmental considerations, not to other issues that may serve to 
undermine those purposes and considerations. 32 
Part II of this Comment describes the legislative history of the 
Clean Water Act and section 404. 33 This section will demonstrate 
the importance Congress places upon section 404 as the statutory 
mechanism for the protection of wetlands from unnecessary destruc-
tion. As explained in this part of the Comment, the legislative de-
termination in favor of wetlands lends significant support for, and 
indeed, virtually compels the use of restoration to remedy section 
404 violations. Part III examines the genesis of the federal courts' 
28 489 F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd mem., 632 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1980). Some of 
the cases that specifically utilized the Weisman requirements include: United States v. Cum-
berland Farms, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1176, 1183 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 
1987), cen. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3555, 3564 (February 23, 1987); United States v. Huebner, 
752 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985); United States v. Robinson, 
570 F. Supp. 1157, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1983); United States v. Carter, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 20307, 20308 (December 21, 1982). 
29 Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1343. 
30 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). 
31 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982). 
32 For example, some courts inappropriately have given great consideration to the hardship 
that restoration will impose on the CWA's violators, see, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 589 
F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (total restoration deemed an inequitable and unduly burdensome 
use of injunction), rather than to the statutory goals of eliminating pollution and restoring the 
nation's waters. 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 41-82. 
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authority to order restoration under the Act, as well as the devel-
opment of the Weisman guidelines. 34 Part IV assesses both the 
environmental shortcomings and benefits of the Weisman test, and 
demonstrates through an analysis of the case law its inadequacy to 
promote the purposes of the Act. 35 Part V of this Comment examines 
the importance of vindicating congressional schemes and purposes 
when conducting equitable balancing in section 404 enforcement ac-
tions. 36 Finally, Part VI provides a synthesis from prior case law of 
those factors which should be featured prominently in section 404 
remedial balancing so as to promote the environmental objectives of 
the CWA. These factors are to: 1) defer, preliminarily, to the agency 
decision to prosecute by deciding the restoration issue, rather than 
remanding to the ACOE for further administrative action;37 2) confer 
maximum environmental benefits;38 3) view the violation in light of 
the statutory and public interests represented in the Act;39 4) design 
a remedy that takes into account the concept of deterring future 
violators. 40 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 404 
When Congress passed the FWPCAA in 1972,41 Congress sub-
stantially rewrote the nation's water pollution control laws. 42 Giving 
34 See infra text accompanying notes 83-117. 
35 See infra text accompanying notes 122-93. 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 231-83. 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 291-94. 
38 See infra text accompanying notes 295-96. 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 297-307. 
40 See infra text accompanying notes 308-10. 
41 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 
(1977) and by Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 46 (1987). Congress overrode President Nixon's 
veto in 1972 to pass the FWPCAA, and had to override President Reagan's veto of the 1986 
reauthorization bill. 
42 The original FWPCA passed Congress in 1948. The FWPCA gave to the states primary 
responsibility for effecting water pollution control because pollution problems appeared to be 
localized. The statute limited the federal government's role to providing support and assistance 
to state programs. Subsequent major revisions to the FWPCA broadened the scope of federal 
participation in water pollution prevention and abatement programs. In 1956, FWPCA amend-
ments authorized increased funding for treatment plants, research and technical assistance, 
and encouraged greater federal-state cooperation in developing a national plan to deal with 
water pollution. In 1965, Congress enacted a second set of major amendments to the FWPCA. 
These legislative additions required states to establish water quality standards for all inter-
state navigable waters within their boundaries. The states' failure to comply with the 1965 
amendments, increasing awareness of the FWPCA's ineffectiveness in solving water pollution 
problems, and the realization that pollution needed to be controlled from its source, prompted 
Congress to legislate the 1972 amendments. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, 
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668,3669-72. 
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the federal government an expanded role in abating water pollution, 
these amendments shifted governmental policy from one that unsuc-
cessfully sought to improve water quality through state-established 
water quality standards to one that regulates the discharge of pol-
lutants from its source by means of a permit system. 43 The statute 
flatly prohibits discharges of pollutants unless the discharger first 
obtains a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).44 The 
granting of a permit alone, however, does not end the government's 
involvement. The FWPCAA contemplated a phased-in application 
of pollution control technology-first by applying the best practicable 
control technology and thereafter by applying best available tech-
nology economically feasible-that would ultimately lead to the elim-
ination of all pollutant discharges into the nation's waters. 45 
The FWPCAA establishes a directed national water pollution con-
trol agenda and intends to accomplish far-reaching objectives. As 
stated in the congressional declaration of goals and policy, "[t]he 
objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."46 The stat-
ute thereafter set forth such optimistic goals as completely elimi-
nating the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985, 
establishing an interim goal of water quality that protects and allows 
for the propagation of wildlife and that provides for recreational use 
of water, and providing a major research and demonstration effort 
to develop technology to help the nation reach its goals.47 Congress 
devised the permit program in 1972 and set high standards for water 
quality to ensure that resources would be applied "to develop the 
means necessary to achieve an environmentally and ecologically 
sound" water supply. 48 
43 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). 
44 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1982); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). 
45 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(A) (1982). See Hall, The Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 NAT. 
RESOURCES LAW. 343 (1978) for a summary of the "extensive fine tuning" of the NPDES 
program and of the FWPCAA as a whole accomplished by the 1977 amendments. 
46 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982). 
47 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (2), (6) (1982). Congress recognized that implementing and achiev-
ing the no-discharge goal would present difficulties. Nevertheless, Congress feared that 
without setting such a goal neither polluters nor the government would make the necessary 
committment to clean up the nation's waters. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, 
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3668,3678. 
48 S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, rep1-inted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3668, 3678. 
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With these and other purposes in mind, Congress enacted the 
section 404 permit program to cover the discharge of dredged49 or 
fill50 materials into the waters of the United States. At the time of 
the FWPCAA's enactment, Congress was not principally concerned 
that section 404 be the main statutory protector of the nation's 
wetlands. The legislative history does not indicate such a concern 
on the part of the statute's drafters. 51 Rather, Congress established 
this separate permit program to cover the discharge of dredged or 
fill materials largely because of administrative convenience. 52 The 
ACOE was already administering a permit program under the Riv-
ers and Harbors Act (RHA) of 1899,53 legislation designed to main-
tain the navigability of the nation's watercourses. Congress felt that 
placing the section 404 permit process under the ACOE's auspices 
would prevent dredged or fill material dischargers from having to 
obtain two permits from two agencies: one NPDES permit from 
EPA under the FWPCAA, and another one from the ACOE under 
the RHA.54 Congress thus gave the ACOE the responsibility for 
49 The ACOE regulations define dredged material as any material ''that is excavated or 
dredged from waters of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1987). Dredged material 
also classifies as a pollutant under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982). 
50 Fill material means "any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic 
area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) 
(1987). 
51 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 911, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL 
INFORMATION SERVICE 129-30 (microfiche no. H643-3) (1972); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1465, 
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 141-42 (mi-
crofiche no. H643-12) (1972); but cf SENATE DEBATE ON CONFERENCE REPORT, reprinted in 
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 178 (microfiche no. S642-3) (1973) (section 404 to 
apply to freshwater lakes and streams). 
52 In fact, the Senate version of the FWPCAA did not create a separate dredge and fill 
permit program under ACOE's auspices but instead included that program in the regular 
NPDES permit program under EPA's control. The House version of the FWPCAA provided 
for a separate section 404 permit process. In conference, the House bill prevailed and Congress 
established section 404. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1465, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, reprinted in 
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 141-42 (microfiche no. H643-12) (1972). A thorough 
discussion of the FWPCAA's legislative history may be found in Ablard & O'Neil, Wetland 
Protection and Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: 
A Corps of Engineers Renaissance, 1 VT. L. REV. 51, 61-74 (1976). 
58 Rivers & Harbors Act, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, (1899) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 401-416 (1982)). Section 10 of the RHA requires a permit to alter or obstruct any of the 
United States' navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). 
54 During the debate on S. 2770, the bill that ultimately passed Congress, Senator Edmund 
Muskie explained in a report the conferees' decision to adopt a separate § 404 permit provision 
as follows: "The Conferees were uniquely aware of the process by which dredge and fill 
permits are presently handled and did not wish to create a burdensome bureaucracy in light 
of the fact that a system to issue permits already existed." SENATE DEBATE ON CONFERENCE 
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conducting reviews of section 404 permit applications, subject to 
guidelines developed by EPA and the Secretary of the Army,55 and 
subject to the ultimate veto power of the EPA Administrator. 56 
Congress' main concern in passing the original section 404 seemed 
to be to reduce the environmental harm caused by those parts of 
dredging and filling operations that affected navigable waters or 
waters that were susceptible of being made navigable. 57 Based on 
its interpretation of Congress' apparent intent, the ACOE did not 
extend section 404 jurisdiction to wetlands that fell outside of these 
traditional concepts of navigable waters. The ACOE operated in 
precisely this fashion until a federal court in Natural Resources 
Defense Council; Inc. v. Callaway ordered the ACOE to revise its 
permit regulations in light of the FWPCAA's broader definition of 
navigable waters. 58 After the Callaway decision in 1975, the ACOE 
could no longer (and did not) limit its jurisdiction under section 404 
to waters which fit into traditional concepts of navigability. 59 
The FWPCAA's far-reaching definition of navigable waters re-
quired that section 404 evolve into a statutory provision that protects 
wetlands. The statute defines navigable waters as "waters of the 
United States, including the territorial seas."60 Congress did not 
intend that the term navigable waters be interpreted narrowly. 61 
Rather, Congress intended that "the term 'navigable waters' be 
given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencum-
bered by agency interpretations which have been made or may be 
made for administrative purposes."62 Applying the broadest possible 
constitutional interpretation of navigable waters greatly increased 
REPORT, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 177 (microfiche no. S642-3) 
(1973) (A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972); see 
also Caplin, Is Congress Protecting our Water?, supra note 15, at 447-48. 
55 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (1982). 
56 Id. § 1344(c) (1982). 
57 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1465, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL 
INFORMATION SERVICE 141 (microfiche no. H643-12) (1972) (government should consider 
permit denial's impact on navigation and anchorage). 
58 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 
1975). 
59Id. For further analysis of the evolution of the broad definition of navigable waters, see 
Note, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Midcourse Corrections in the Section 404 Program, 57 
NEB. L. REV. 1092 (1978) [hereinafter Note, CWA's Midcourse Corrections]; Note, Wetlands' 
Reluctant Champion, supra note 1, at 221-27. 
60 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). 
61 H.R. REP. No. 911, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. _, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMA-
TION SERVICE 131 (microfiche no. H643-3) (1972). 
62 Id. 
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federal jurisdiction under section 404. 63 As a consequence of the 
expanded coverage under section 404, the ACOE began to protect 
wetlands more than it had prior to the Callaway decision. 
When Congress passed amendments to the FWPCAA in 1977, 
Congress essentially ratified the Callaway court's decision that the 
ACOE use section 404 to preserve and protect wetlands. Many 
factors provide strong evidence of this ratification. The bill that 
Congress ultimately passed did not restrict the jurisdictional reach 
of section 404, despite several attempts to accomplish that result. 64 
In fact, Congress noted that to limit section 404's jurisdiction "would 
cripple efforts to achieve the act's objective[s]" of restoring the 
nation's waters to their natural state. 65 In passing amendments to 
section 404, Congress wanted to dispel fears that the permitting 
program was regulating activities that Congress had not intended 
the section to regulate. 66 
Equally important, the congressional debates concerning the pas-
sage of the amendments specifically addressed the need for section 
404 to protect the nation's wetlands. In the Senate, Senator Edmund 
Muskie, a primary sponsor of the 1977 amendments, commented 
that: 
[t]here is no question that the systematic destruction of the 
Nation's wetlands is causing serious, permanent ecological dam-
age. The wetlands and bays, estuaries and deltas are the Nation's 
most biologically active areas. They represent a principal source 
of food supply. They are the spawning grounds for much of the 
fish and shellfish which populate the oceans, and they are pas-
sages for numerous upland game fish. They also provide nesting 
areas for a myriad of species of birds and wildlife. 
The unregulated destruction of these areas is a matter which 
needs to be corrected and which implementation of Section 404 
has attempted to achieve. tW 
63 For a discussion ofthe ACOE's response to the Callaway court's order to write regulations 
that account for expanded jurisdiction under § 404, see generally Note, Wetlands' Reluctant 
Champion, supra note 1, at 227-38; Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water?, supra note 
15, at 449--54; Note, Federal Control of Wetlands: The Effectiveness of Corps' Regulations 
under § 404 of the FWPCA, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 505, 512--14 (1976). 
64 A description of the several legislative attempts to restrict ACOE's section 404 jurisdic-
tion can be found in Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water?, supra note 15, at 459-80; see 
also Note, CWA's Midcourse Corrections, supra note 59, at 1106-08. 
65 S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess 75, reprinted in, 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4326, 4400. 
66 Id. 
67 123 Congo Rec. 26,697 (1977). 
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The Senator's comments, as well as the passage of the CWA in 
1977, demonstrate conclusively that Congress intended for section 
404 to protect the nation's wetlands. As the government noted in its 
briefin United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., "whatever 
doubt may have existed concerning the intended reach of the CWA 
over wetlands was completely laid to rest by the 1977 Amendments 
to the statute."68 
Despite keeping the broad jurisdictional reach of section 404, Con-
gress added sixteen subsections to that provision. 69 Congress added 
the amendments to section 404 partly out of concern that the sec-
tion's jurisdictional scope would intrude unnecessarily upon activities 
that would have only a negligible impact on water quality.70 Among 
the more significant amendments are the general permit program 71 
and the exemptions from permit requirements for normal farming, 
silviculture, and ranching activities. 72 Under the general permit pro-
gram, the ACOE may issue general permits on a state, regional, or 
nationwide basis if the activities causing the discharges are similar 
in nature and will cause only minimal, adverse environmental effects, 
either separately or cumulatively.73 Once the ACOE issues a general 
permit for a specific activity, the need for an individual permit is 
obviated if the discharger's dredge and fill activity is the same as 
that described in the general permit and meets the condition of the 
permit. 74 
Similarly, dischargers who wish to perform the agricultural activ-
ities described in subsection (f) do not need to obtain permits from 
68 Brief for the United States, Petitioner, at 22, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc. 474 U.S. 121 (No. 84-701) (1985). The scope of juris diction under section 404 has remained 
a subject of controversy, as the Reagan administration has focused on section 404 as a target 
of regulatory reform. Currin, Clean Water Act Section 404 Jurisdiction: Mandatefor Reform, 
4 DET. C.L. REV. 825,827-31 (1982). Congress has not yet restricted legislatively wetlands 
protection under section 404. The Reagan administration has, however, made itself susceptible 
to charges that it is not enforcing properly section 404. As a consequence of this lack of 
enforcement, wetlands protection has suffered. See, e.g., Oversight Hearings on Section 404 
of the Clean Water Act Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate 
Comm. on the Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. _, (1985) reprinted in 
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE passim (microfiche no. S321-5) (1986) (statements of 
Senator John Chafee, subcommittee chairman). 
69 33 U.S.C. § 1344(d)-(t) (1982). 
70 S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 77, reprinted in, 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4326, 4402. 
71 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (1982). 
72 I d. § 1344(0. 
73 Id. § 1344(e). 
74Id. 
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the ACOE.75 The courts have construed these agricultural exemp-
tions narrowly76 due to a limiting paragraph77 in the subsection. This 
limiting paragraph, commonly referred to as the recapture provision, 
provides that discharges which are incidental to a project converting 
navigable waters into a use to which they were not subject previ-
ously require a permit.78 For example, a farmer who wants to con-
vert wetland acreage into additional farmland cannot do so without 
a permit because the wetland was not previously used for farming. 79 
In contrast, a farmer who discharges dredge or fill materials into a 
wetland as an incident of on-going farming activities probably does 
not require a permit.80 Congress wisely limited the scope of the 
75Id. § 1344(0(1). The agricultural exemption section provides as follows: 
(O(I)Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this SUbsection, the discharge of dredge 
or fill material-
(A)from normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing, 
seeding, cultivation, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and 
forest products, or upland soil and water conservation practices; 
(B)for the purpose of maintenance, including emergency reconstruction of recently 
damaged parts, of currently serviceable structures such as dikes, and bridge abut-
ments or approaches, and transportation structure; 
(C)for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm or stock ponds or 
irrigation ditches, or the maintenance of drainage ditches; 
(D)for the purpose of construction of temporary sedimentation basins on a con-
struction site which does not include placement of fill material into the navigable 
waters; 
(E)for the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm roads, or temporary 
roads for moving mining equipment, where such roads are constructed and main-
tained, in accordance with best management practices, to assure that flow and cir-
culation patterns and chemical and biological characteristics of the navigable waters 
are not impaired, that the reach of the navigable waters is not reduced, and that any 
adverse effect on the aquatic environment will be otherwise minimized; 
(F)resulting from any activity with respect to which a State has an approved 
program under section 208(b)(4) which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) 
and (C) of such section, is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under 
this section or section 301(a) or 402 of this Act (except for effluent standards or 
prohibitions under section 307). 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1241 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 474 U.S. 
817 (1985); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 925 n.44 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
77 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(2) (1982). The limiting paragraph provides in full: 
Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters incidental to 
any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a 
use to which it was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable 
waters may be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required 
to have a permit under this section. 
78Id. 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Larkin, 657 F. Supp. 76, 85-86 (W.D. Ky. 1987); United States 
v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1175-76 (D. Mass. 1987). 
80 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(1), (2) (1982). 
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agricultural exemptions, as approximately eighty percent of wetland 
losses result from agricultural conversion.81 
Despite the general permit program and the limited agricultural 
exemptions, the statutory command against unauthorized discharges 
remains intact. Congress seems comfortable with the idea that the 
ACOE should use section 404 to prevent wetlands destruction. As 
Senator John Chafee, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on En-
vironmental Pollution, commented: "[t]he section 404 Dredge and 
Fill Program is the most important regulatory tool the Federal 
Government has to stem the loss of wetlands."82 The Senator's ob-
servation states succinctly the primary purpose of section 404: pre-
venting unnecessary wetlands loss. This purpose makes clear the 
need for effective enforcement of section 404. Effective enforcement 
of section 404 mandates the use of restoration injunctions for those 
who violate the statute. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESTORATION GUIDELINES 
The enforcement provisions of the Clean Water Act do not mention 
specifically that courts may order restoration as a remedy for sta-
tutory violations.83 The statute, however, authorizes the EPA to 
seek appropriate civil relief, including a temporary or permanent 
injunction,84 and grants to the federal courts jurisdiction to restrain 
81 OTA REPORT, supra note 11, at 8. 
82 Oversight Hearings on Section 404 of the Clean Water Act Before the Subcomm. on 
Environmental Pollution of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. _(1985), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1 (microfiche 
no. S321-5) (1986). 
83 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982). In fact, Congress did not discuss the remedy of restoration when 
Congress recently passed the provision for administrative penalties. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 
1004, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. _, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 131--32 
(microfiche no. H643-12) (1986). 
84 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982) as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 46 (1987). An 
injunction is an order that directs a defendant to act or to refrain from acting in a specified 
manner. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.10 at 105 (1973) [hereinafter DOBBS]. An injunction that forbids 
certain conduct is known as a prohibitory injunction, while an injunction requiring affirmative 
action on the part of a defendant is called a mandatory injunction. Id. This Comment concerns 
itself primarily with mandatory injunctions, although prohibitory orders play an important 
part in the § 404 enforcement scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 823 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 107 (1986). 
Anyone of three types of injunction-permanent, preliminary or temporary, or temporary 
restraining orders-may be issued. DOBBS, at 106. The differences between the categories of 
injunctions are largely procedural. A court may enter a permanent injunction after each party 
has had a full opportunity to present evidence, or after the court decides a motion such as 
summary judgment. I d. A court may issue a preliminary or temporary injunction after notice 
to the defendant and a hearing on the merits of the motion. Id. The opportunity to present 
1988] WETLANDS RESTORATION 309 
violations and require compliance with the Act. 85 Courts have ex-
ercised their statutorily conferred equitable powers to order both 
prohibitive injunctions demanding cessation of illegal dredging and 
filling discharges,86 and affirmative injunctions requiring restoration. 
In finding their authority to order restoration, some courts87 have 
analogized to cases mandating restoration under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act (RHA) of 1899.88 
evidence is not a requisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Finally, a temporary 
restraining order (TRO) is an ex parte injunction. [d. at 107. A TRO's issuance requires 
neither notice nor opportunity for a hearing. [d. 
85 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982). Under § 1344(s), Congress authorized the Secretary of the 
Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to seek the same relief specified under § 1319 
when the terms of § 404 permits are violated. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(s). Thus, the present enforce-
ment scheme calls for the EPA to initiate actions against violators who by-pass the § 404 
permit process altogether, and the ACOE to prosecute those who violate permit conditions 
or limitations. 
86 See, e.g., Akers, 785 F.2d at 823. 
87 See, e.g., Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1180; Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1342-43. 
88 Rivers & Harbors Act, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 401-416 (1982». Section 10 of the RHA, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899) (codified as amended 
at 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1982», prohibits the placement of unauthorized obstructions in the navig-
able waters (defined essentially but not entirely by their navigability-in-fact) of the United 
States. [d. The enforcement section of the RHA allows courts, in their discretion, to order 
the removal of any structure which violates the provisions of the act. [d. § 406. Congress 
enacted the RHA in response to the decision in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 
U.S. 1 (1887), in which the Supreme Court held that "there is no common law of the United 
States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers." Willamette, 125 U.S. 
at 8. 
Since the statute's passage, courts have consistently interpreted the RHA expansively. 
United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1299 n.lO (5th Cir. 1976). The 
Supreme Court addressed specifically the issue of a broad interpretation of the RHA in United 
States v. Republic Steel, 362 U.S. 482 (1960). In that case, the defendants were steel mill 
operators who discharged industrial waste solids into a navigable river, thereby raising the 
elevation of the river bottom and reducing the river's navigable capacity. [d. at 483-84. The 
Court held that where Congress has, by its legislative enactment, made its intent clear, it 
need not provide for every contingency in the statute itself. [d. at 492. The Court found that 
Congress had "provided enough federal law in § 10 from which appropriate remedies may be 
fashioned, even though they rest on inferences." [d. 
The expansive reading of the RHA became more crucial toward the end of the 1960's as 
public awareness of environmental concerns grew. At about that time, courts came to view 
§ 10 of the RHA not simply as requiring the removal of unauthorized obstructions in the 
navigable waters, but also as a way to restore the whole water environment which had been 
damaged. Haagensen, Restoration as Federal Remedy for Illegal Dredging and Filling Op-
erations, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 124-25 (1977); see also Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 207-
08 (5th Cir.) (environmental considerations unrelated to traditional navigability concepts up-
held as valid reasons for denying an RHA § 10 permit), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1970). 
The RHA permit program also served as a model for the FWPCAA and, more particularly, 
§ 404. A more detailed analysis of the RHA's relationship to the FWPCAA can be found in 
Haagensen, supra, and Comment, Federal Protection of Wetlands Through Legal Process, 7 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 567, 579-89 (1979). 
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Two RHA cases from Florida89-United States v. Joseph G. Mor-
etti, Inc.,90 and United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc. 91-have 
served as guidance for some courts that have considered whether to 
order restoration under section 404. In the Moretti series of deci-
sions,92 which concerned appropriate remedies for permitless dredg-
ing and filling operations, the district court found that a mandatory 
injunction requiring restoration was an appropriate use of injunctive 
power authorized by the RHA.93 The court determined that the word 
"obstruction" aR used in the RHA was broad enough to justify the 
removal of any obstruction or any diminution of the navigable ca-
pacity of a waterway. 94 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the reasoning of the district court. The 
appeals court held that the district court found its authority to order 
restoration not only from the express language of the RHA itself, 
but also from the trial court's inherent equitable power to enforce 
the policy of the Act. 95 Subsequently, the trial court ordered the 
89 The Fifth Circuit decided the cases on the same day. 
90 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971), 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), on remand, 387 F. Supp. 
1404 (S.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 
1976), on remand, 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976), vacated mem., 592 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
91 389 F. Supp 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd in part and remanded, 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 
1976). A third case, Weiszmann v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F.2d 1302 
(5th Cir. 1976), on remand, 545 F. Supp. 721 (S.D. Fla. 1982), has also helped to guide courts 
in determining whether to order restoration under § 404. The Fifth Circuit decided Weiszmann 
on the same day that it decided Moretti and Sexton Cove. In writing its decision in Weiszmann, 
the Fifth Circuit relied on the reasoning developed in Sexton Cove. Weiszmann, 526 F.2d at 
1304. For that reason, the case is not analyzed in the text but is discussed in note 97, infra. 
92 The defendants thrice appealed decisions by the district court. Moretti, 478 F.2d 418 (5th 
Cir. 1973); Moretti, 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976); Moretti, 592 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1979). 
93 Moretti, 331 F. Supp. at 158. The defendants violated the RHA by dredging and filling 
in navigable water while developing a mobile home park in the Florida Keys. [d. at 156. In 
the process, defendants completely destroyed a thriving mangrove area, also resulting in the 
loss of other plant and animal life in a sensitive estuarine ecosystem. [d. Despite cease and 
desist orders issued by the ACOE and state officials upon their discovery of this illegal 
construction activity, defendants persisted in their excavation. [d. at 157. Even when a 
corporate officer, Joseph G. Moretti, Jr., was arrested for violating the RHA, the company 
bearing the family name continued to dredge and fill illegally. [d. at 155. The defendants' 
flagrant disregard for the law placed the defendants in a poor equitable position to argue the 
unfairness of the restoration order. Moretti, 526 F.2d at 1308. 
94 Moretti, 331 F. Supp. at 158. 
95 Moretti, 478 F.2d at 430. The statutory authority for the RHA injunction provides in 
relevant part: "[t]he removal of any structures or parts of structures erected in violation of 
the provisions of said sections (401, 403, and 404) may be enforced by the injunction of any 
district court exercising jurisdiction .... " 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1982). 
The circuit court stated that it had "no doubt that the issuance of a mandatory injunction 
requiring extensive restoration operations at very large expense to the developers is entirely 
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defendants to restore the property on which they had conducted 
permitless dredging and filling activities, after first having an op-
portunity to present objections to the restoration plans. 96 
The most significant of the RHA decisions for section 404 enforce-
ment purposes is United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc.,97 in 
which the Fifth Circuit outlined the test many courts later employed 
to determine whether to order restoration in Clean Water Act en-
forcement actions. In Sexton Cove, the defendants destroyed a man-
grove area and all its wildlife while digging out ten canals as part of 
a seventy-three acre mobile home park development in southern 
Florida. 98 The defendants conducted their excavation without the 
required RHA permits. 99 Consequently, the district court ordered 
within the Court's power as expressly mandated by the statute." Moretti, 478 F.2d at 430-
3l. 
96 Moretti, 423 F. Supp. 1197, 1202 (S.D. Fla. 1976), vacated mem., 592 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
97 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976). The court in United States v. Weiszmann, 526 F.2d 1302 
(5th Cir. 1976) used the reasoning developed in Sexton Cove to uphold the trial court's 
restoration order and the lower court's jurisdiction over one of Weiszmann's canals. [d. at 
1304. Weiszmann had dug two canals as part of a residential development. When the ACOE 
told him that connection of the canals to a pre-existing one would require a permit, Weiszmann 
disputed and ignored this advice. [d. at 1303. He then proceeded to connect one of the canals 
to the pre-existing one; the other remained landlocked. [d. at 1303-04. When ACOE demanded 
that he plug the newly attached canal, he filed a declaratory judgment action to restrain the 
ACOE from exercising jurisdiction over the canal. [d. at 1304. The trial court not only denied 
him his relief, but it also granted the government's counterclaims for restoration of both 
canals. [d. Interestingly, the government also requested relief under the FWPCAA but only 
to impose civil penalties for a § 404 violation (relief the court granted), not to order restoration 
under that section. [d. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed in part and remanded. [d. at 1304. It dismissed 
Weiszmann's objection to the validity of the restoration order for the reasons set forth in 
Sexton Cove. [d. As in Sexton Cove, however, the appeals court held that the ACOE did not 
have jurisdiction over the landlocked canal. [d. The Fifth Circuit then vacated the restoration 
order for the second canal because the district court's order lacked a "factual record estab-
lishing that the court's choice of the specific restoration ordered was based upon a compre-
hensive evaluation of the factors involved and the practicalities of the situation. " [d. Seven 
years later, after negotiations between the ACOE and Weiszmann had failed, and after 
Weiszmann was cited for contempt of court, the trial court held a hearing on restoration. 
Weiszmann v. District Engineer, United States Army Corps of Engineers, 545 F. Supp. 721, 
723 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Using the guidelines set forth in Sexton Cove, the court rejected 
Weiszmann's proposal and accepted a modified version of the ACOE's plan to re-plug the canal 
so as to promote benthic development but not to restore the wetlands destroyed by Weisz-
mann's dredging activities. [d. at 727. 
98 Sexton Cove, 389 F. Supp. at 605-06. 
99 [d. at 605. The defendants excavated the canals, five of which they connected to Key 
Largo Bay, five of which remained landlocked and unconnected to any other waters. [d. The 
trial court found that defendants had ignored the directives of the ACOE, which had written 
to the defendants three times to advise them that their construction activities required a 
permit, id., and operated for their personal gain. [d. at 606. The trial court also found that it 
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the defendants to 'fill the five plugged canals-canals not yet con-
nected to another body of water-and three of the unplugged ones, 
to replant mangrove plants along the banks of the restored canals, 
and to fill in part of the remaining two connected canals. 100 
In ordering this restoration, the court reasoned that a broad con-
struction of the RHA was necessary "to effect the expressed intent 
of Congress and to protect the navigational and environmental public 
interest. "101 Further, the court found that it possessed "far greater" 
injunctive authority to order the requested restoration because the 
defendant's unlawful activities implicated the public interest, as ex-
pressed by an act of Congress. 102 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit did not quarrel with this part of the 
district court's reasoning. The circuit court found that the district 
court had "powerful tools at its disposal" to fashion relief under the 
RHA.103 Nonetheless, the appeals court reversed the decision in part 
and remanded. It found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over 
the landlocked canals104 and that the defendant did not have an 
"adequate opportunity" to present evidence as to the restoration 
issue. 105 To guide the district court on the remanded issued of res-
toration, the Fifth Circuit stated: 
The full effects of any environmental disturbance are difficult to 
measure. Attempts to reverse such effects and restore the en-
vironment to its natural state carry with them no guarantee of 
success. Hence, any restoration plan must be carefully designed 
to confer maximum environmental benefits. At the same time, 
the law must be tempered with a touch of equity. The degree 
had jurisdiction under RHA § 10 over all ten canals, id. at 607-08, and that defendants' 
development violated that section by placing obstructions in navigable waters. [d. at 610. 
100 [d. at 613. 
101 [d. at 610. 
102 [d. The court also explained that the government need not prove two traditional require-
ments of injunctions, irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy at law, to obtain injunctive 
relief. The court noted that the "'United States, however, is not bound to conform with the 
requirements of private litigation when it seeks the aid of the courts to give effect to the 
policy of Congress as manifested in a statute.''' [d. at 609, citing United States v. Underwood, 
344 F. Supp. 486, 494-95 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
103 Sexton Cove, 526 F.2d at 1301; see also id. at 1298 n.lO. 
104 [d. at 1299. 
106 [d. at 1301. The Fifth Circuit also made other key decisions in the case. The appeals 
court expanded the ACOE's jurisdiction under the RHA by ruling that dredge and fill oper-
ations above the ACOE's self-imposed jurisdictional boundary, the mean high tide line, may 
come within the permit provisions of the RHA. [d. at 1298-99. (This issue was also important 
in Moretti and Weiszmann). In addition, the court held that corporate officers could not be 
held civilly liable under the RHA absent proof of a piercing of the corporate veil. [d. at 1300-
01. 
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and kind of wrong and the practicality of the remedy must be 
considered in the formulation of that remedy. 106 
313 
The court for the Middle District of Florida in United States v. 
Weisman107 drew upon the reasoning developed in the RHA cases108 
to order restoration in a case involving section 404. 109 Using Sexton 
Cove as its primary guide, the court succinctly articulated the five 
requirements that the government must establish before courts may 
impose a restoration order upon defendants in section 404 cases. 110 
The court found that Sexton Cove required satisfying two criteria 
before the court could consider the restoration plan itself: 1) the 
court must have jurisdiction over the property or activity affected 
by the plan;lll and 2) the court must hold a hearing to discuss the 
merits, drawbacks, and alternatives to the plan. 112 Once the court 
meets these prerequisites, the court may order restoration (assum-
ing liability) if the plan: 1) confers maximum environmental bene-
fits;113 2) is achievable as a practical matter;114 and 3) bears an eq-
uitable relationship to the degree and kind of wrong the plan intends 
to remedy.115 Significantly, the trial court did not find it necessary 
to provide a detailed explanation of its authority to issue a mandatory 
injunction requiring restoration. This is significant because the 
court's reliance on the RHA cases,116 as well as its citation to the 
purpose of the CWA 117-to restore and maintain the nation's waters 
in their natural condition-seemed to the court to be sufficient jus-
tification for its ability to direct Weisman to restore his property to 
a condition approximating its natural state. 
106 Sexton Cove, 526 F.2d at 1301 (citations omitted). 
107 489 F. Supp. 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1980), a/I'd mem., 632 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1980). 
108 United States V. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976); United States 
V. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); United States V. Weiszmann, 526 
F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976). 
109 The United States brought claims under both § 404 of the CWA and § 10 of the RHA. 
Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1333. Weisman had constructed a new roadway on his property 
after the ACOE had denied him a permit to do so. Id. at 1335-36. In the building process, 
Weisman destroyed 2.2 acres of wetlands, id. at 1346, and affected another 14.5 acres. Id. at 
1349. Consequently, the court found violations of both statutes. Id. at 1339-40. The ACOE 
would have issued a permit for modification of a pre-existing road, but Weisman rejected that 
option for personal, aesthetic reasons. I d. at 1335. 
llO I d. at 1342-43. 





ll6Id. at 1349. 
117 Id., citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
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Three distinct features of the Weisman decision have special sig-
nificance for section 404 cases. First, the Weisman case marked the 
first time that a court applied the Sexton Cove guidelines to resto-
ration cases involving section 404. Even though the Weisman court 
never stated specifically that the sole authority for restoration rested 
on injunctive relief available under section 404, the bulk of the 
decision analyzed the CWA claim and the effect of the defendant's 
activities on wetlands above the mean high tide line. 118 Because 
section 404, but not the RHA, covers at least those dredge and fill 
activities occurring above that point, the opinion as a whole strongly 
suggests that the restoration remedy the Weisman court imposed 
derived from the federal courts' injunctive powers under the CWA. 
The Weisman case has thus served as an important precedent for 
courts ordering restoration on the basis of section 404 alone. 119 
The second feature of the Weisman decision that has special sig-
nificance for section 404 cases is the court's articulate definition of 
the broad criteria by which future courts could determine whether 
to order restoration when section 404 violations have occurred. The 
court's discussion of each determinant provides an insight into ways 
in which courts may use the Weisman criteria either to promote or 
retard the environmental aims of the CWA. The Weisman court's 
discussion of these standards also suggests a manner by which courts 
may improve the balancing process conducted in section 404 enforce-
ment actions. 
The third important aspect of the Weisman case is related to the 
second. The articulation in Weisman of three principal standards by 
which to judge restoration remedies represents a variant of the 
traditional equitable balancing process that normally occurs in the 
common law context. Typically, this common law process involves a 
balancing of competing, usually private, interests in which the court 
acts as arbiter. 12o In this context, the Weisman standards are useful 
tools for analyzing whether the decisions of those courts that have 
not used the criteria, as well as the opinions of those judges who did 
liB See generally, Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1343-48. The mean high water mark, defined 
as the "average height of all high waters over a given location during a span of 18.6 years," 
id. at 1335 n.7, has traditionally been the cut-off point for the ACOE's jurisdiction under the 
RHA. Id. at 1340. Section 404 of the CWA covers dredge and fill activities both above and 
below that point. 
119 See, e.g., Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. at 122; Carter, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20309; see also 
United States v. Fleming Plantations, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1705, 1706 (April 21, 1975) 
(restoration ordered under CWA without need to discuss RHA claim). 
120 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2nd 870,309 N.Y.S.2d 
312 (1970) (equitable balancing to consider appropriate remedy for nuisance). 
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employ them, promote the environmental aims and purposes of the 
CWA. 
Courts that have weighed whether to require restoration under 
section 404 prior to the Weisman decision generally engaged in a 
balancing process without following a delineated set of equitable 
guidelines. l2l The problem with this and the Weisman court ap-
proaches, however, is that they neglect or fail to emphasize suffi-
ciently the statutory and environmental imperatives of the CWA, 
imperatives that should weigh heavily on the side of the party seek-
ing restoration. Thus, the Weisman standards, which exemplify the 
more traditional, common law approach to equitable analysis, fall 
short of promoting the environmental goals and purposes of the 
CWA. An appropriate set of equitable balancing standards should 
instead seek to advance the CWA's remedial environmental objec-
tives. 
IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS AND DEFICIENCIES OF THE 
WEISMAN ApPROACH TO SECTION 404 RESTORATION ORDERS 
The manner in which courts have balanced the three main stan-
dards enunciated in Weisman122 illustrates both the standards' pos-
itive and negative environmental aspects when courts apply them to 
section 404 restoration cases. 123 In general, courts have misused 
these standards to undercut the purposes and intent of the CWA. 
However unintentionally this may have been, a test that courts 
conceivably could have used to promote the environmental objectives 
of the Act too frequently has been employed to nullify the effect of 
121 See. e.g., Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 674-75 
(E.D. N.C. 1975), u,ff'd, 528 F.2d 250,252 (4th Cir. 1975) (district court appropriately balanced 
the rights of the parties in refusing to order restoration or to enjoin violation of FWPCAA); 
Fleming Plantations, 12 Envt. Rep. Cas. at 1709. 
122 The three Weisman standards used to determine whether a court should order restoration 
are whether the plan: 1) confers maximum environmental benefits; 2) is feasible as a practical 
matter; and 3) bears an equitable relationship to the degree and kind of wrong the plan intends 
to remedy. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1343. 
12:1 This section focuses primarily on the three requirements of restoration which address 
the merits of the proposed plan. Once the preliminary requisites of jurisdiction and a hearing 
are met, they do not have a direct bearing on the decision to issue a restoration order. To 
determine whether the court has jurisdiction over a particular parcel of wetlands under § 404, 
it need only compare the characteristics of that land with those contained in the regulatory 
definition under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1987). Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, 715 F.2d at 910-
913 (comparison of soil, vegetation, and hydrology of land against wetlands regulatory defi-
nition upheld as valid method of determining § 404 jurisdiction). If the soil, vegetation, or 
water conditions reasonably match those described in the definition, the court has jurisdiction 
to require compliance with the CWA. [d. 
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the CWA's purposes. The shortcomings occur primarily when courts 
engage in an equitable balancing process to determine whether the 
restoration plan is achievable practically and whether the plan is 
appropriate given the degree and kind of section 404 violation. This 
balancing process effectively undermines the court's attempt to con-
fer maximum environmental benefits because, as the cases demon-
strate, these last two criteria too frequently justify the misuse of a 
court's discretion to devise a remedy that does not effectuate the 
CWA's remedial objectives. 124 
A. Conferring Maximum Environmental Benefits 
The Weisman court's requirement that a restoration plan confer 
the maximum environmental benefits must remain part of any bal-
ancing of the equities that courts may perform in fashioning relief 
under section 404. The reasons for the necessity of this criterion are 
straightforward. This standard admirably serves the environmental 
purposes of the CWA and gives effect to the stated intent of Con-
gress-to restore and maintain our nation's waters in their natural 
state. 125 Equally important, however, achieving the most beneficial 
environmental result represents an absolute standard from which 
courts cannot retreat. 126 Either a plan confers the optimal benefit or 
it does not. No middle ground exists in which a violator may rea-
sonably suggest that a less than environmentally superior proposal 
will suffice to meet this goal. Finally, such an uncompromising stan-
dard reinforces the notion that the legal system takes violations of 
section 404 seriously. As a consequence, this judicial seriousness 
might deter those who may be tempted to violate section 404 but 
who would not do so because of the strong possibility of having to 
reverse the damage caused by their activity. 127 
124 This point becomes even more evident when one examines the cases in light of the CWA's 
declarations of national purpose, as well as the statutory prohibition against unauthorized 
discharges. To enforce the statute properly, courts must utilize a balancing test which places 
greater emphasis on an environmentally principled reading of the CWA and its objectives. 
See infra text accompanying notes 271-332, for suggestions on more appropriate equitable 
considerations. 
125 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982). 
126 The court in United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1245, did manage to compromise this 
theoretically uncompromisable standard, however. See infra text accompanying notes 215-
218. 
127 This not to suggest, however, that restoration is the only manner by which courts may 
confer maximum environmental benefits. In some instances, mitigation-requiring the defen-
dant to deed in perpetuity to the government another wetland to replace the destroyed one 
or to set aside funds for this purpose-may more appropriately accomplish the requirement's 
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To determine whether a plan confers maximum environmental 
benefits, courts may compare the proposed restoration plans with 
the wetlands characteristics the ACOE regulations deem impor-
tant. l28 Courts should order the plan which will result in restoration 
of the characteristics outlined in the ACOE regulations. In Weisman, 
the court used this approach to determine both the environmental 
harm the defendant's uniawful activities had caused and which liti-
gant's plan would confer maximum environmental benefits. First, 
the court described the current state of defendant Weisman's prop-
erty, noting the environmental effects of the defendant's unlawful 
construction activities. 129 The court then examined the harmful con-
sequences of the defendant's actions by assessing the actions' impact 
against the ACOE regulations that describe important wetland func-
tions deemed vital to the public interest. 130 It found that Weisman's 
land performed several of the functions mentioned in the ACOE's 
regulations;13l consequently, returning the area as closely as possible 
objectives. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 752 F.2d 1501, 1507 (11th Cir. 1985), 
reh'g en bane denied, 778 F.2d 793 (llth Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1831 
(1987). In such a situation, courts must impose sufficient mitigation damages to ensure that 
the defendant fully compensates for the environmental harm caused and to promote other 
environmental reasons-for example, deterring future violators-for ordering restoration 
under the CWA. 
128 The ACOE general policies for permit issuance state the several wetlands functions 
which it designates as important to the public. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2). These important 
wetland characteristics include: 
(i) Wetlands which serve significant natural biological functions, including food 
chain production, general habitat and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites 
for aquatic or land species; 
(ii) Wetlands set aside for study of the aquatic environment or as sanctuaries or 
refuges; 
(iii) Wetlands the destruction or alteration of which would affect detrimentally 
natural drainage characteristics, sedimentation patterns, salinity distribution, flush-
ing characteristics, current patterns, or other environmental characteristics; 
(iv) Wetlands which are significant in shielding other areas from wave action 
erosion, or storm damage. Such wetlands are often associated with barrier beaches, 
islands, reefs and bars; 
(v) Wetlands which serve as valuable storage areas for storm and flood waters; 
(vi) Wetlands which are ground water discharge areas that maintain minimum 
baseflows important to aquatic resources and those which are prime natural recharge 
areas; 
(vii) Wetlands which serve significant water purification functions; and 
(viii) Wetlands which are unique in nature or scarce in quantity to the region or 
local area. 
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2) (1987). 
129 Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1343-45. 
130 [d. at 1345-47. 
131 [d. at 1346-47. 
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to its natural state would most benefit the environment. 132 Finally, 
the Weisman court considered the restoration plans proposed by 
both plaintiff and defendant in light of its earlier findings concerning 
the harm that Weisman's activities caused to the wetland. The court 
concluded that the government's proposal outweighed the defen-
dant's because the latter's plan would not result in restoring the 
environmental characteristics important to this wetland. 133 Other 
courts have used an approach similar to that of the Weisman court 
in arriving at a conclusion to the maximum environmental benefits 
issue. 134 
The Weisman court's analysis of whether a restoration plan con-
ferred maximum environmental benefits is sound for two reasons. 
First, the court utilized the relatively neutraP35 ACOE regulations 
by which to assess the impact136 of illegal dredge and fill operations 
and to determine the advantages of restoration. The standards are 
available to all courts and would make determinations of this issue 
consistent. Second, the process of examining evidence against par-
ticular standards involves a function that courts do best--conducting 
factual analysis by comparing evidence against a specific set of re-
quirements to see which evidence produces the most favorable res-
olution. Judges thus have little room in this process, if followed 
correctly, for substituting their own policy choices in place of hard 
fact-finding. Consequently, the courts' use of the Weisman approach 
to determine whether a restoration plan confers maximum environ-
mental benefits should result in consistent and factually well-
grounded resolutions of this issue. 
In actual implementation, however, conferring maximum environ-
mental benefits may be trickier to achieve than a proposed plan 
132Id. at 1347. The court stated: "The wetland forest on the Weisman property is like 
productive farmland, producing a crop which is harvested not by man but by the natural 
action of the seasons and the tides." I d. at 1346. The court went on to point out that man also 
benefits from the wetlands' bounty. Wetlands produce detritus, an organic material which is 
produced from decayed vegetation. If not absorbed into the wetlands, detritus is flushed out 
into estuaries and harbors, where it serves as food for aquatic organisms, which in turn serve 
as food for fish and shrimp. Id. 
133Id. at 1347-48. 
134 Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1245; Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1160; United States v. Bradshaw, 
541 F. Supp. 884, 885-86 (D. Md. 1982); United States v. Board of Trustees of Florida Keys 
Community College, 531 F. Supp. 267, 271-73 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
135 The phrase "relatively neutral" is used because the ACOE definition of wetlands leaves 
unprotected a significant portion of the nation's wetlands. Note, Wetlands Protection, supra 
note 11, at 239. 
136 The degree of harm to the environment, however, is irrelevant for liability purposes 
under the CWA because the statute provides for strict liability. See infra text accompanying 
notes 170-176 for additional analysis of liability under the CWA. 
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would indicate. As the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Sexton 
Cove,137 a restoration plan is not guaranteed to succeed. 138 The res-
toration process may take twenty to thirty years before the damaged 
wetland will closely approximate its formerly undisturbed state. 139 
Even such a lengthy period does not ensure that the wetlands' 
former plant and animal life will recover fully from the unlawful 
dredging and filling operations. In fact, the restored wetland may 
never again perform all of the valuable functions that it performed 
prior to its destruction. 140 Nevertheless, one study commissioned by 
the EPA recommended that the ACOE focus on restoration of eco-
logically degraded wetland areas or enhancement of ecologically less 
valuable wetlands as the best alternatives for mitigating unlawful 
wetlands destruction. 141 This recommendation, as well as the pos-
siblity that the wetland may regain completely its former ecological 
state, makes crucial the effort to confer maximum environmental 
benefits. 
B. Achievability as a Practical Matter 
From a statutory and environmental perspective, the Weisman 
criterion that a court-ordered restoration plan be feasible as a prac-
tical matter has produced less than satisfactory results. This require-
ment may be interpreted in two ways. For one, practicality can 
mean the achievability of restoration from an engineering and en-
vironmental viewpoint. 142 This interpretation simply requires that 
the restoration plan is capable of being implemented and is likely to 
provide the environmental benefits promised. Such an interpretation 
nicely complements the first Weisman standard. That is, a plan 
cannot possibly confer maximum environmental benefits if it cannot 
be implemented and if it is unlikely to succeed. In fact, the court in 
137 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976). 
138 I d. at 1301. 
139 Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1347. 
140 Telephone conversation on March 10, 1987 with Michael Sheehan, Senior Biologist, 
United States Army Corps of Engineers, Waltham, Massachusetts. 
141 R. Reimold & S. Cobler, Wetlands Mitigation Effectiveness 73-74. No studies have been 
done concerning the long-term effectiveness of restoration injunctions. Telephone conversation 
on February 8, 1988 with Matt Schweisberg,' Wetlands Ecologist, EPA Region I, Boston, 
MA. Restoration, however, is gaining favor generally. In January 1988, the first major national 
conference on '''Restoring the Earth'" was held in Berkeley, California. Among the participants 
were scientists, ecologists, and industry and government officials. In addition, companies 
specializing in environmental restoration have emerged. Wetland, tropical forests, prairies 
and river wildlife restoration are all targets of restoration ecology. Begley, Zuckerman & 
Drew, Making Nature Whole Again, (January 18, 1988) NEWSWEEK 78-79. 
142 Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1164. 
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Weisman implied that practicality should have this meaning. 143 The 
Weisman court, however, felt constrained by its understanding of 
the Sexton Cove decision not to limit the interpretation of practicality 
to mean feasible in an engineering and environmental manner. 144 
Subsequently, no court has interpreted this prong of the test solely 
in this limited manner. 
Instead, courts have enlarged the meaning of practicality to in-
clude consideration of a restoration plan's economic feasibility and 
cost-effectiveness. 145 With this understanding, courts have examined 
the financial resources of the defendant(s), 146 as well as the cost to 
the defendant(s) of the restoration plan147 in assessing the viability 
of a particular proposal. Such an interpretation diminishes the sig-
nificance of conferring maximum environmental benefits in two re-
spects. First, under this broad interpretation of practicality, poten-
tial defendants have an economic incentive to create large restoration 
costs in hopes that courts will find that the expense of restoration 
will offset the engineering and environmental feasibility of taking 
such action. By logical implication, the greater the dollar amount of 
wetlands destruction, the less likely it is that courts will require 
restoration. This reasoning has been partly if not completely suc-
cessful in preventing the imposition of restoration orders in several 
cases. 148 
The second way in which the enlarged meaning of the practicality 
standard diminishes the significance of conferring maximum envi-
ronmental benefits is by over-emphasizing economics. Over-empha-
sis on economics frequently leaves the goal of reaching the best 
environmental result merely as rhetorical exhortation. In United 
States v. Huebner, for example, the Seventh Circuit reversed a 
restoration injunction primarily because it deemed the lower court's 
order to be cost-ineffective. 149 As a basis for its decision, the appeals 
143 Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1348. The judge reasoned that since the plaintiff's plan 
contained less doubt about its results than the defendant's proposal, it was more practical. 
[d. 
144 [d. 
145 Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. at 123; Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1164; Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 
at 1348. 
146 Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. at 123; Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1164. 
147 M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F.2d at 1507 (restoration too costly); Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. at 
123. 
148 See, e.g., M.C.C. of Florida, 772 F.2d at 1507; Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1245. Courts have, 
however, ordered the restoration oflarge areas of wetlands. See, e.g., United States v. Murff, 
13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20199 (August 6, 1982) (consent decree approved requiring 
defendant to restore 8000 acres of wetlands to their original hydrologic and biotic regimes). 
149 752 F.2d at 1245. 
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court merely used the Huebners' assertion that the injunction would 
destroy a cranberry bed worth $400,000. 150 Similarly, the Eleventh 
Circuit in United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc. refused to reverse 
a district court order denying restoration in part because it consid-
ered the government's two alternative restoration plans too costly. 151 
The court made this determination despite finding that the damage 
to the wetland was "devastating"152 and without considering ex-
plicitly whether the cost of restoration equalled the cost of the 
damage caused by the defendant's illegal conduct. 153 
An interpretation of the practicality standard that permits these 
results is inappropriate. Because the economic marketplace histori-
cally has not placed sufficient value on the functions that wetlands 
perform,l54 any economic balancing of the wetlands value as com-
pared to the value of the developer's project, as in Huebner, or as 
compared to the cost of compensation for the damage caused, as in 
M.C.C. of Florida, invariably results in the scale tipping against the 
wetlands. By virtue of section 404, however, Congress has upset the 
old economic balance and tipped the scale in favor of wetland pro-
tection and restoration of unlawfully destroyed wetlands. The pur-
pose of the CWA is to protect and restore the nation's waters, not 
to protect the financial interests of those who have violated the law. 
Consequently, judicial notions of cost-effectiveness should not un-
dermine the environmental priorities that Congress has set. 
This is not to argue, however, that economics has no place in a 
discussion of restoration alternatives. Economic analysis performs 
the vital function of determining the dollar amount of wetlands dam-
age for which defendants are responsible due to their unlawful dredg-
ing and filling. Further, economic analysis may be useful in choosing 
among alternative restoration plans, all of which confer maximum 
environmental benefits. Once courts have determined the maximum 
environmental benefits to be attained, they appropriately may con-
sider alternative means of reaching the desired goals. Economics 
then may become a factor in choosing among equivalent restoration 
150 [d. 
151 772 F.2d at 1507. The government's suggested plans would have cost $793,414 or 
$742,063. [d. at 1504. Both the trial and appellate courts stated that the plans also were too 
speculative, but neither court elaborated on the economics nor the speculative nature of the 
plans. [d. 
152 [d. at 1503-04. 
153 See also United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975) (lower 
court order in RHA case requiring completb removal of fill modified because appeals court 
decided, without explanation, that defendant lacked finances to effect total removal of fill). 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
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plans. Courts should not, however, use economics as a basis for 
determining what constitutes maximum environmental benefits for 
the wetland at issue. 155 In this way, economic considerations remain 
subordinate to the goal of maximizing environmental benefits. This 
subordination will serve better the protection and preservation of 
wetlands, as well as the statutory intent of the CWA. 
c. Assessing the Degree and Kind of Wrong 
The final Weisman requirement-that the restoration be equitable 
in view of the degree and kind of wrong committed by the defen-
dant-provides courts with the greatest flexibility to undermine, in 
effect, statutory purposes and the quest to achieve the maximum 
environmental benefits. Too frequently, courts appear to weigh the 
degree and kind of harm the restoration plan imposes on the statute's 
violator. In one early case involving violations of section 404, the 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina refused to 
enjoin a defendant's fill activities on ten acres of wetlands and order 
restoration in part because the plaintiffs' lawsuit had inflicted "griev-
ous injury upon the Corporation"156 and the court did not want to 
add to the defendant corporation's problems by forcing it to restore 
the destroyed property. 1m Similarly, the district court in United 
155 The only economic consideration which could mitigate against the primary environmental 
goal is financial insolvency. Debts resulting from environmental injunctions may not take 
priority over other claims in a bankruptcy proceeding, and may be discharged, thus allowing 
debtors to escape from the obligations they owe society. See Comment, The Future of the 
Environmental Enforcement Injunction After Ohio v. Kovacs, 13 B.C. ENV. AFF. L. REV. 
397 (1986) for a discussion of the inherent tension between the environmental laws and the 
bankruptcy code. Obviously, a restoration order that forces a defendant into bankruptcy would 
not help the wetlands, either. Short of provoking insolvency, however, the restoration order 
should hold the defendant liable for the full cost of his statutory violations. 
In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) is the only case in which an individual 
sought the protection of the bankruptcy laws after a court required him to restore a wetlands 
area. In the section 404 proceeding, United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157 (M.D. Fla. 
1983) the defendant unsuccessfully tried to defeat the jurisdiction of the court by engaging in 
a land conveyancing scheme. Id. at 1164. When the court ordered restoration, the court 
specifically found that defendant had the financial resources necessary to accomplish the 
restoration. Id. at 1164-65. The defendant's actions indicate that he was intent on defeating 
the government's enforcement action, a goal which seemed to succeed when the bankruptcy 
court determined that the restoration order could not be enforced because Robinson was under 
its jurisdiction. In re Robinson, 46 Bankr. at 139. The bankruptcy court, however, later re-
imposed the judgment in the § 404 proceeding because Robinson had failed to file an appeals 
brief. United States v. Robinson, 55 Bankr. 355, 356 (M.D. Fla. 1985). 
156 Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 674-75 (E.D. 
N.C. 1975), aff'd, 528 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1975). 
157 The court did order the defendants to apply for an after-the-fact permit which, if denied, 
would cause it to reconsider its refusal to deny the injunctive relief. Conservation Council, 
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States v. Lambert158 refused to order the defendant to restore two 
of three unlawfully filled-in wetlands despite finding that the defen-
dant violated section 404. Defendant Lambert unlawfully had used 
wetlands to dispose of scallop shells from his seafood business. 159 
The Lambert court justified its decision not to order complete res-
toration by noting that the defendant's filling had not "so significantly 
disrupted"160 the environment of an adjacent navigable water as to 
require restoration. 161 Despite the CWA's prohibition of all unper-
mitted discharges, not merely of those which, in the court's opinion, 
significantly disrupt the environment, the Lambert court decided 
that ordering restoration of two of the three affected wetlands would 
present an "unduly burdensome and inequitable application of in-
junctive power. "162 
Other cases also demonstrate the tendency of courts to give sig-
nificant consideration to the violators' hardships. In United States v. 
Robinson,163 the court refused to order complete restoration because 
such an injunction would be "inequitable. "164 The court came to this 
conclusion despite the defendant Robinson's knowledge that a per-
mit, which defendant did not obtain, was necessary for his fill 
activities165 and that the defendant concocted a land conveyancing 
398 F. Supp. at 675. The court did not. however, enjoin the defendant's construction work 
pending approval of the permit. I d. 
Other considerations in favor of the defendant included the court's beliefs that the § 404 
violations were minimal in terms of their environmental effect, the development of the subject 
property was inevitable, the defendant's comprehensive proposal would have a less detrimental 
environmental effect than haphazard building, and the defendant had agreed to deed in 
perpetuity to the government 9000 acres of salt marsh and beaches. Id. at 674-75. 
158 589 F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984). 
159 Unit~d States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 538 (11th Cir. 1983). 
160 Lambert, 589 F. Supp. at 372. 
161Id. 
162 I d. The court, however, ordered the defendant to restore a different part of his property 
which he had filled in because of the fill's effect on the environment. Id. at 374. All violations 
of the CWA, however, not simply significant ones, require complete compensation by the 
defendant. 
163 570 F. Supp. 1157 (M.D. Fla. 1983). 
164 I d. at 1165. 
165 Id. at 1163-64. The defendant knew that he needed both state and federal permits to fill 
in his wetlands because he had objected previously about a neighbor's unpermitted construc-
tion activities. Id. at 1159. In fact, Robinson applied to state and federal agencies for the 
required permits. Id. at 1160. He began filling his property before obtaining the permits, 
although the state subsequently approved his permit application. Id. at 116l. Robinson ex-
ceeded the bounds of the state permit and never received approval for the ACOE permit. 
The court ordered restoration of the wetland only up to the state permit line, even though 
the court's opinion indicates that the defendant needed a federal permit for that portion of 
the property as well. Id. at 1165. 
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scheme with which he attempted to foil the government's enforce-
ment action. 166 Similarly, in Weisman, where the judge found a 
"flagrant and defiant"167 violation of the law, the court believed that 
assessing the degree and kind of wrong presented the toughest 
question in the case. 168 The Weisman opinion indicates that the court 
at least considered the possibility of permitting flagrant violations 
to go unremedied. 169 Given the facts in Robinson and Weisman, any 
equitable considerations that the defendants had in their favor are 
difficult to discern. 
As the above discussion demonstrates, courts have some difficulty 
preventing this third Weisman requirement from overwhelming the 
CWA's environmental goals and purposes. Courts should not find 
this so difficult, however, when the CWA's strict liability provisions 
and the ACOE's enforcement regulations properly are taken into 
account. 
The CWA creates strict liability by flatly prohibiting the unau-
thorized discharge of pollutants into the nation's waters, including 
wetlands. 170 Consequently, the intentions of a defendant in complying 
or not complying with the statute should be irrelevant for enforce-
ment purposes.l7l As the district court noted in United States v. 
Board of Trustees of Florida Keys Community College,172 "[t]he 
166 The defendant conveyed his property to a relative, stipulated his wife-an original co-
owner of the property and thus a defendant-out of the lawsuit, then instructed the relative 
to convey the property back to his wife. [d. at 1164. The court refused to allow this scheme 
to succeed, however. [d.; but see, supra, note 155. 
167 Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1349. 
168 [d. The court had this belief because the ACOE had admitted that it would have granted 
a permit for the new roadway, which Weisman built without a permit, had no viable alternative 
existed. [d. 
169 [d. at 1349. The court had the inclination that it only had to choose the proper site for a 
road on the defendant's property, id., thereby implying that the legal transgressions commit-
ted by Weisman were secondary and relatively unimportant. The court, of course, did not 
follow this inclination. 
170 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982); see also United States v. City of Fort Pierre, South Dakota, 
580 F. Supp. 1036, 1041 (D. S.D. 1983) (CWA is strict liability statute), rev'd on other grounds, 
747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d. 368, 374 (10th 
Cir. 1979) (CWA provides for strict liability). The limited exemptions-such as the agicultural 
exemptions and the nationwide permit program---created by the statute do not alter this 
analysis. Dischargers must act within the limits of the exemptions or be subject to liability 
under the Act. 
171 United States v. Saint Bernard Parish, 589 F. Supp. 617, 619 (E.D. La. 1984); Bradshaw, 
541 F. Supp. at 886. Obviously, the intent of a defendant matters greatly if the government 
pursues criminal penalties under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). Criminal intent, however, is not ad-
dressed in this article. 
172 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
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mandatory nature of the statutes is consistent with the Congres-
sional interest in preventing the destruction of natural resources 
which may be difficult or impossible to restore, and of eliminating 
pollution from the nation's waters."173 
Strict liability has significant ramifications for enforcement of sec-
tion 404. This liability standard requires that the courts keep the 
focus of inquiry on the violation, not the acts of the violator. Con-
sequently, the strict liability standard requires courts to order rem-
edies that fully compensate for all environmental losses caused by a 
defendant's discharges, whether the discharges were purposeful or 
negligent. 174 Once a court finds that a defendant has unlawfully 
deposited dredged or fill material onto a wetlands, the violation itself 
should mean that the defendant, at a minimum, compensate for all 
the environmental losses. 175 In section 404 cases, the CWA's envi-
ronmental objectives mandate that courts frequently use restoration 
173Id. at 274. The court used the word statutes in plural fonn because it also referred to 
the RHA, which the court found to have a comparable strict liability standard. Id. 
174 The court in Board of Trustees seemed to follow this reasoning when it ordered the 
defendant trustees either to pay a $3000 fine and restore the illegally destroyed wetland area, 
id. at 275-76, or to pay a $15,000 fine and restore a different part of the trustees' property 
to a condition comparable to that of the fonnerly undamaged wetland. Id. at 275. The court 
based the defendant's options on the estimated $12,000 cost of restoration of the destroyed 
wetland, id. at 272, plus an additional $3000 as civil penalty for violating the CWA. Id. at 
276. The court issued such a strict injunction because it detennined that the environmental 
hann was great, even though the affected area was small. Id. at 275. 
Not all courts have used the Board of Trustees court's approach, however. For example, in 
United States v. Lambert, the court held that the defendant's pennitless filling of a wetland 
on his property did not so significantly disrupt an adjacent body of navigable water that it 
would order restoration. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. at 372. The court felt that such an order 
would be inconsistent with the burden restoration would impose on the landowner and that 
the court should not use its injunctive powers to penalize a landowner for improving his 
property. Id. Such reasoning conveniently overlooks the defendant's failure to abide by the 
statutory and regulatory provisions of the CWA. The statute does not regulate merely sig-
nificant (whatever that tenn may mean) discharges of pollutants. The CWA seeks to regulate 
virtually all of them. Thus, although the Lambert court ordered the defendant to restore 
another section of wetlands which he had filled in, id. at 374, the court's disregard for the 
statutory scheme demonstrates a major problem with the equitable balancing process em-
ployed by most courts in trying to achieve the law's objectives. 
175 Complete compensation may occur through the use of restoration or other types of 
mitigation measures, such as requiring a defendant to preserve in perpetuity another wetland 
area of equal size and ecological value. Civil penalties, by themselves, are insufficient to 
compensate for the environmental losses caused by unlawful dredging and filling operations. 
When used in conjunction with restoration or other sorts of mitigation, however, civil penalties 
can have a useful deterrent effect on future violators. Courts should impose civil fines that 
are commensurate with the severity of the violation. Thus, the greater the wetland damage 
a defendant caused, the greater the civil fine the court should order. 
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of wetlands to their natural condition as an appropriate remedy to 
achieve complete compensation. 176 
The ACOE enforcement regulations are another factor that makes 
the courts' application of the third Weisman standard puzzling. 
These regulations create a sequential enforcement scheme that 
places a premium on negotiated resolution of section 404 disputes 
and becomes more harsh, requiring litigation, only when negotiations 
fail. 177 The regulations distinguish between violations caused by un-
authorized and authorized activities. 178 Upon the discovery of un-
authorized dredging or filling operations, the regulations require the 
ACOE's district engineer to notify the parties responsible for uncom-
pleted projects. Usually, this notification is in the form of an order 
prohibiting further work. 179 The regulations provide that the district 
engineer should, in appropriate cases, then conduct an 
investigation180 to determine whether the illegal activity jeopardizes 
life, property, or important public resources. 181 If such jeopardy 
exists, the district engineer should order the violator to undertake 
initial corrective measures. 182 If the violator complies with the ACOE 
order, the violator may apply for an after-the-fact permit that may 
allow him to complete the activity that prompted the district engi-
neer's initial concern. 183 If the violator fails to pursue this option and 
176 One problem with the strict liability standard of the CWA is that the statute does not 
have a comparably stringent enforcement mechanism. The equitable discretion retained by 
courts after Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, see infra text accompanying notes 252-80, may 
(but should not) allow persons strictly liable under the CWA to get away without compensating 
fully for the environmental damage caused. Thus, the Act creates a certain tension between 
its liability and enforcement provisions. One possible solution to this problem is to re-write 
the CWA to provide for the automatic issuance of an injunction upon the finding of a § 404 
violation and to require compensation exactly proportional to the amount of damage caused 
by the unlawful activities. Further analysis of this possibility is outside the scope of this 
article, however. 
177 Dinkins, Shall We Fight or Will We Finish: Environmental Dispute Resolution in a 
Litigious Society, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10398, 10400 (November, 1984) [here-
inafter Dinkins, Environmental Dispute Resolution]. The revised regulations adopted as final 
in November, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 41220-60 (1986), are considerably more lenient than the 
regulations they replace. For example, the revised regulations remove mandatory language 
requiring the district engineer to take specific action, and substitute language which grants 
the district engineer great discretion in deciding what action, if any, to take to correct 
violations. Cf. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3-.4 (July 1, 1986) with 33 C.F.R. § 326.3-.4) (1987). 
178 33 C.F.R. § 326.3 and § 326.4 (1987). 
179Id. § 326.3(c)(1). The regulations recognize that a cease and desist order should not be 
necessary for an unlawfully completed project, but the district engineer must still notify the 
responsible parties of possible violations. Id. § 326.3(c)(2). 
180 Id. § 326.3(d). 
181Id. 
182 [d. 
183 Id. § 326.3(e)(1). 
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to comply with the ACOE order, the district engineer may refer the 
matter to the United States Attorney for legal action. 184 
The enforcement regulations governing violations of authorized 
work are even more lenient. Once the ACOE district engineer de-
termines that a permittee has violated the terms of a permit and 
that the violation is significant enough to warrant an enforcement 
action, he should contact the permittee and attempt to resolve the 
violation through either voluntary compliance or permit modifica-
tion. 185 If the attempt fails, the district engineer may then order the 
permittee to comply with the permit within a maximum of thirty 
days.186 In the event that the permittee fails to comply with the 
order, the district engineer then may consider suspending or revok-
ing the permit, or also recommend legal action. 187 The ACOE regu-
lations are thus designed to give section 404 violators considerable 
opportunity to correct their violations before the ACOE resorts to 
court action. 188 
Given the strict liability standard and the ACOE's relaxed enforce-
ment regulations, the courts' emphasis on the hardships that full 
restoration may impose on CWA violators has several negative ef-
fects. Such emphasis means that section 404 violators likely will not 
bear the full costs of their environmental destruction. By not order-
ing full restoration, the courts permit section 404 violators to benefit 
from the alteration of the destroyed wetlands without compensating 
for the full environmental damage caused. Such emphasis on the 
section 404 violators' hardships also undercuts the effectiveness of 
governmental enforcement actions by allowing statutory violations 
to go unremedied. Deterring potential CWA violators is made more 
difficult when courts, in essence, ignore statutory violations. For 
these reasons, the third Weisman requirement should be revised to 
promote more effectively the environmental aims and deterrent pur-
poses of the CWA. 
184 Id. § 326.5(a). Once the ACOE initiates an enforcement action the agency will not process 
an after-the-fact permit. Id. § 326.3(e)(1)(ii). The regulations also recommend that the district 
engineer seek a civil penalty for cases involving willful, flagrant, repeated or substantial 
impact violations of the CWA. Id. § 326.5(a). 
185Id. § 326.4(d). 
186Id. 
187Id. 
188 Id. In 19&'1, the ACOE dealt with more than two thousand cases involving § 404 viola-
tions, but only five percent were referred to the Justice Department for prosecution. The 
ACOE resolved the overwhelming majority either by using restoration agreements or by 
having violators submit to the permitting process. Dinkins, Environmental Dispute Resolu-
tion supra note 177, at 10400. 
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An analysis of the degree and kind of wrong a defendant commits 
may playa role outside of the judicial decision to order a restoration 
injunction however. The defendant's behavior throughout the pro-
ceeding with the ACOE and the court should factor into a decision 
as to whether or not the defendant will pay civil penalties in addition 
to compensation for the harm done to the wetlands. Once the sta-
tutory violation is remedied, the court may then focus its attention 
on the defendant's actions and decide whether to impose a civil 
penalty for the purpose of: 1) punishing the defendant for inappro-
priate activity such as violating the ACOE cease and desist orders189 
or court orders;19o 2) eliminating profits from the illegal activity;191 
or 3) deterring future defendants from believing they may flout the 
law without consequence. 192 If, however, the defendant has complied 
with all administrative or court orders and merely has been an 
unsuccessful litigant in a wetlands action, the court properly may 
withhold the imposition of fines as long as the statutory violation 
was remedied appropriately.193 Using an analysis of the degree and 
189 Conrad, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20532-33 (defendant who ignored five cease and desist 
orders in constructing condominiums on wetlands ordered to pay $100,000 civil penalty or to 
deed 200 acre natural site in perpetuity to county government). 
190 United States v. Sami, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20431 (April 18, 1984) (civil 
penalty of up to $25,000 ordered for failure to perform restoration and to post bond); United 
States v. Kirkland, 518 F. Supp. 65, 66 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (defendants fined $1000, threatened 
with jail sentence for contempt of court, and ordered to restore part of property for violating 
consent decree); ct. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235 (no civil penalties required despite § 404 violations 
and failure to abide by consent decree). 
191 Tull, 615 F. Supp. at 626 (defendant fined $5000 per home lot illegally filled in to prevent 
defendant from benefitting from unlawful acts on lots which could not be restored). In Tull, 
the Supreme Court ultimately held that the defendant had a Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial on the issue of liability for penalties. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1838. Nevertheless, the 
rationale behind imposing the civil penalties remains valid. 
192 Trial Brief of United States Attorney on Issue of Penalty and Restoration at 2-3, United 
States v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Mass. 1986) (No. 85-0864-Y); Tull, 
769 F.2d at 187 (fines part of package of remedies designed to accomplish deterrence, among 
other objectives); Lambert, 589 F. Supp. at 374 (fine imposed along with restoration because 
defendant violated CWA). 
193 In Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. at 124-25, the court essentially agreed with the government 
that the flagrancy of the defendant's conduct warranted a civil penalty. The court, however, 
preferred to use Ciampitti's resources toward restoration, but cautioned that his good faith 
in implementing the plan would affect the amount or necessity for civil penalties. [d.; see also, 
United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880, 883 (D. Md. 1982); but ct. Avoyelles Sportmen's 
League, Inc. v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 536-37 (W.D. La. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part and remanded, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983) (no restoration ordered because defendants 
complied with all court and administrative orders). In Avoyelles, however, the court did not 
appropriately remedy, either through restoration or civil penalties, the clearing of thousands 
of acres of forested wetlands. [d. Still, its analysis for not ordering restoration could be applied 
to a consideration of the appropriateness of civil penalties. 
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kind of wrong in any of these ways would make the standard more 
appropriately advance the CWA's objectives. 
D. United States v. Huebner: An Example of the Statutory and 
Environmental Shortcomings of the Weisman Approach 
The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Huebner194 dramatically demonstrates how the requirements of the 
Weisman test may be used improperly so as to subvert the goals 
and purposes of the CWA. In Huebner, the Wisconsin western dis-
trict court had ordered, among other remedies, restoration of a ten 
acre cranberry bed that defendants had constructed unlawfully. 195 
The Huebners owned a 5000 acre parcel ofland which was the largest 
continuous area of wetlands in Wisconsin. 196 The Huebners intended 
to convert the wetlands, a portion of which contained cranberry 
bogs, into land suitable for growing upland crops. They also planned 
to expand their existing cranberry beds. 197 
Shortly after beginning their expansion and conversion activities 
in 1977, the ACOE issued several cease and desist orders because 
of alleged section 404 violations. 198 The ACOE soon filed suit against 
the Huebners, requesting a permanent injunction against further fill 
activities and civil penalties. 199 The action was settled by consent 
decree in June 1978.200 
The consent decree essentially required the defendants to comply 
with the provisions of the CW A, although the decree placed greater 
burdens of notice on them. Among other actions, the decree required 
the Huebners to: 1) obtain a permit for any dredge and fill activities 
on their property; 2) contact the ACOE twenty days in advance of 
their intention to conduct dredge or fill operations so that the ACOE 
could notify them of the need for a permit; 3) restore and maintain 
specific areas of the wetlands in their pre-filled condition; and 4) pay 
a $1000 fine. 201 
In late 1982, the ACOE again sued the Huebners, this time for 
violating the consent decree. 202 The district court then determined 
194 752 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985). 
195 Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1237. 
196 [d. 
197 [d. 
198 [d. at 1237--38. 
199 [d. at 1238. 
200 [d. 
201 [d. 
202 [d. at 1238--39. 
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that the Huebners' activities in violation of the consent decree and 
section 404 warranted the restoration of the cranberry bed.203 Spe-
cifically, the district court found the defendants in contempt of the 
1978 consent decree and in violation of section 404 by virtue of the 
following activities: 1) the defendants removed wetland vegetation 
from three reservoir sites and leveled the reservoir dikes in prepa-
ration for planting dryland crops;204 2) they cleaned and deepened 
existing ditches and excavated a new one, which resulted in the 
draining of additional reservoirs;205 3) the Huebners filled in wetlands 
by maintaining farm roads at greater width than was necessary;206 
4) the defendants unlawfully bulldozed large mounds of dirt;207 and 
5) they expanded their cranberry beds by ten acres by converting 
wetlands into land suitable for cranberries. 208 To determine a remedy 
for violating the consent decree and the statute, the trial judge 
ordered the Huebners to maintain certain water levels at specified 
locations around the property, and also to conduct restoration, in-
cluding environmental reversal of the ten acre cranberry bed expan-
sion. 209 The court used the Weisman test to conclude that restoration 
was an appropriate remedy. 210 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit confirmed each of the court's find-
ings concerning the violations and contempt. 211 In addition, the cir-
cuit court rejected other arguments which the Huebners raised on 
appeal. 212 The remaining question for the court to decide was 
whether the trial court had abused its discretion in ordering resto-
ration of the ten acre cranberry bed. 213 Surprisingly, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the trial court had abused its discretion. 214 
In concluding that destruction of the expanded cranberry bed was 
neither '''cost-effective nor environmentally warranted,"'215 the ap-
203 I d. at 1237. 
204 I d. at 1241. 
205 I d. at 1242. 
206 I d. at 1242--43. 
207 I d. at 1243. 
208Id. 
209 I d. at 1245. 
210 I d. at 1244-45. 
211 Id. at 1242-44. 
212Id. at 1241, 1243-44. The Huebners unsuccessfully argued that their activities fell within 
§ 404's agricultural exemptions, id. at 1241, that the government was estopped from pursuing 
their claim because of alleged misrepresentations by the ACOE officials, id. at 1244, and that 
they were denied due process by the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence. Id. at 1243. 
213Id. at 1245. 
214 Id. 
215Id. 
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peals court completely ignored the Weisman standards that it pur-
ported to use. The judges first dismissed the trial court's finding 
that the cranberry bed '''would not achieve the maximum environ-
mental benefits for the land at issue ... "'216 without disagreeing 
with the lower court's ruling. Instead, the court found it sufficient 
merely that cranberry beds "are compatible with wetlands. "217 Even 
though the Seventh Circuit conceded that the alleged compatibility 
reduced the wetlands' capacity to carry out two functions-water 
filtration and flood storage-which the ACOE regulations deem vital, 
it did not alter its position concerning the first prong of the Weisman 
test. 218 The appeals court also did not clarify whether compatibility 
was to replace conferring maximum environmental benefits as the 
standard by which to judge the effectiveness of a restoration plan. 
As for the requirement that the plan be achievable as a practical 
matter, the court never discussed it explicitly. The circuit judges 
mentioned only that the ten acres of cranberry beds had an estimated 
worth of $400,000. 219 The court neither discussed whether the res-
toration plan was achievable from an environmental standpoint, nor 
examined the cost of the plan or defendant's assertion of the beds' 
approximate value. Neither the decision in Weisman nor in United 
States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc. sanction such a superficial anal-
ysis under this standard. 
Finally, the circuit court found that two equitable considerations 
tipped the balance away from the restoration required by the trial 
court's allegedly "draconian exercise of judicial discretion."22o First, 
some evidence indicated that the Huebners might have received a 
permit had they applied for one. 221 Using this evidence as a basis for 
reversal, however, ignores the existence of the CWA's permitting 
requirements. The government would not have had to pursue an 
enforcement action had the Huebners applied for a permit as re-
quired both by section 404 and the consent decree. For the court to 
rely on conjecture as to action the Huebners might have taken 
regarding the permitting process contradicted the court's pronounce-
ment that "proper compliance with the permit process is all that is 
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nation's wetlands proceeds with care. "222 As the Huebners did not 
comply properly with the permit process, the court's speculation 
about what might have occurrred had the defendants not broken the 
law is not a sufficient reason to overturn the restoration order. 
The Seventh Circuit's other "equitable" basis for reversal was that 
the court believed that the ACOE's cognizance of the Huebners' 
activities was a factor to be given "considerable weight" in deciding 
upon appropriate relief. 223 The defendants had alleged that the 
ACOE's cognizance and approval of their work estopped the agency 
from pursuing claims under the CWA.224 The Seventh Circuit, how-
ever, had affirmed the district court's rejection of the Huebner's 
estoppel claim.225 The appeals court's reasoning in subsequently us-
ing a claim it had rejected as a primary basis for reversing a resto-
ration order demonstrates the weakness of the court's reasoning. 226 
Consequently, despite affirming the district court's findings as to 
section 404 and consent decree violations,227 and basing its equitable 
considerations on questionable foundations,228 the Seventh Circuit 
reversed the major part of the restoration order.229 When an equi-
table balancing test may be misconstrued so as to allow such egre-
gious violations to go unremedied,230 the necessity for standards that 
more clearly take into account the environmentally protective nature 
of the CWA becomes obvious. 
V. EQUITABLE BALANCING AND VINDICATION OF STATUTORY AND 
PUBLIC INTERESTS 
When Congress passed the CWA, it did more than establish a 
comprehensive program for the clean-up of the nation's waters. By 
222 [d. at 1246; see id. at 1239 (permit process is the cornerstone of the CWA scheme). 
223 [d. at 1245. 
224 [d. at 1244. 
225 [d. at 1244. 
226 The Huebner court's curious reasoning may in part be explained by the significant 
pressure imposed on it by the Wisconsin Cranberry Growers Association, a group that filed 
an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the defendants. The amicus curiae brief apparently 
emphasized that Wisconsin leads the nation in the production of cranberries, Huebner, 752 
F.2d at 1235 n.2, and that failure to reverse the lower court's order would hamper seriously 
the ability of Wisconsin farmers to continue to grow cranberries. [d. at 1245. Although the 
court specifically rejected the Cranberry Growers Association's contentions, id., ultimately 
the court gave the organization (and the defendants) what they wanted, while paying lip 
service to the CWA's requirements. 
227 Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1241-43. 
228 [d. at 1245. 
229 [d. at 1246. 
230 The Huebner court did not even assess civil penalties against the defendants. 
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enacting the CWA, Congress also established the national policy that 
the public's interest in clean water would be served best by restoring 
the nation's waters to their natural condition and working to elimi-
nate completely the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the 
United States. Those individuals and entities who violate the CWA 
also violate this legislatively-created policy. Courts should, there-
fore, consider the public's interest when determining an appropriate 
remedy for violations of section 404. 
Two United States Supreme Court cases, Tennessee Valley Au-
thority V. Hill231 and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo232 demonstrate 
the necessity for courts to consider the statutory and public interests 
embodied in remedial statutes such as the CW A when engaging in 
equitable balancing to fashion remedies for statutory violations. In 
each case the Court specifically addressed the appropriateness of 
equitable balancing where violations of environmental statutes had 
occurred.233 In Hill, the Court determined that the traditional bal-
ancing of the equities was not appropriate , 234 while in Romero-Bar-
celo the Court seemed to endorse such a process.235 A main, over-
arching theme running through both opinions, however, is that 
remedies must vindicate congressional choices by promoting public 
and statutory interests. 236 In the section 404 context, such vindica-
tion necessarily will entail wetland restoration as a remedy for sta-
tutory violations. 
The plaintiffs in Hill had obtained a permanent injunction from 
the Sixth Circuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 
enjoining it from completing the Tellico Dam project which, if fin-
ished, would destroy the existence of the snail darter.237 The snail 
darter is a species of perch protected under the Endangered Species 
Act.238 The Endangered Species Act commands all federal agencies 
to insure that actions which they authorize, fund, or carry out do 
231 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
232 456 U.S. 305 (1982). 
233 The Hill case involved the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982), and 
Romero-Barcelo concerned the CWA. 
234 Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. 
235 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320. 
236 See Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 513, 526 (1984) [hereinafter Farber, Equitable Discretion]. 
237 Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (6th Cir. 1977). The Sixth 
Circuit had reversed the district court's failure to enjoin the TVA. 
23B 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1986). The Department of the Interior first listed the snail darter 
on the endangered species list in 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 470505-06 (1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.11(h». 
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not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species, or do 
not destroy or modify such species' habitats. 239 The Court noted that 
this statutory command was to apply without exception. 240 
For the Supreme Court, the primary issue the case presented was 
whether a potential violation of the Endangered Species Act re-
quired the court to enjoin completion of the dam without engaging 
in the customary equitable balancing process. 241 The Court began its 
analysis of the question by recognizing the principle that '''a grant 
of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders hardly suggests an absolute 
duty to do so under any and all circumstances. "'242 The Court con-
tinued along this line of argument by stating that "[a]s a general 
matter it may be said that '[s]ince all or almost all equitable remedies 
are discretionary, the balancing of equities and hardships is appro-
priate in almost any case as a guide to the chancellor's discretion. "'243 
Following this reasoning, the balancing test the district court used 
in denying injunctive relief would appear to have been appropriate. 244 
The Supreme Court in Hill, however, did not find the above-
quoted language sufficient under the circumstances. Instead, the 
Court held that enforcement of the statute required the issuance of 
the permanent injunction.245 It reasoned that where "Congress has 
spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the 
balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the 
highest of priorities," the Court possesses no authority to balance 
other equities against the congressional mandate. 246 Moreover, Con-
gress has the exclusive responsibility to formulate legislative policies 
and programs and also to establish the policies' and programs' rela-
tive priority for the country.247 The courts merely have the respon-
sibility to enforce Congress' decisions. 248 Consequently, "[o]nce the 
239 [d. at 173. 
240 [d. at 164 n.15. The Endangered Species Act subsequently was amended to permit 
exceptions to the statute if certain criteria are met. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1982). 
241 Hill, 437 U.S. at 156. 
242 [d. at 193, citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). Presumably, this 
principle would also apply in the context of a CWA enforcement action. 
243 Hill, 437 U.S. at 193, citing DOBBS, REMEDIES 52 (1973) 
244 See, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). Following the same reasoning, the balancing 
test courts have utilized in § 404 restoration cases was appropriate also. 
245 Hill, 437 U.S. at 194. In relevant part, the statute states that: "Each federal agency 
shall ... insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out ... is not likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
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meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality de-
termined, the judicial process comes to an end. "249 As a matter of 
separation of powers, equitable balancing should not be used to 
countenance a continuing violation where the statute provides oth-
erwise.250 For these reasons the Supreme Court in Hill affirmed the 
Sixth Circuit's decision to enjoin completion of the Tellico Dam proj-
ect to protect the snail darter's continued existence. 251 
In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, the Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether a violation of the CWA required the Court to restrain 
immediately the violator's activities. 252 In this case, the United 
States Navy violated the CWA by discharging bombs without per-
mits off the coast of a Puerto Rican island in the course of conducting 
training exercises. 253 The Court found that the CWA did not foreclose 
completely the exercise of a court's discretion. 254 Rather, the CWA 
allows a court "to order that relief it considers necessary to secure 
249 [d. at 194-95. 
250 This proposition is embraced and persuasively advanced in Plater, Statutory Violations 
and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524 (1982). Professor Plater divides the traditional 
common law balancing test into three, distinct components: Threshold Balancing, Determi-
nation of Contending Conducts, and Discretion in Fashioning Remedies. [d. at 536. In the 
threshold balancing area, the court determines whether plaintiffs are entitled to maintain 
their actions. During this phase of the proceeding, courts look to examine whether estoppel 
or injunctive requirements, for example, preclude the relief plaintiff seeks. If not, courts 
begin the second area of the balancing process. In this area, courts determine whether to 
abate the complained of conduct. If abatement is warranted, the court proceeds to the final 
balancing phase, the process of fashioning equitable remedies. [d. 
Professor Plater contends that statutes have removed the second component of equitable 
balancing from the court's discretion. The decision to abate certain conduct "is taken over 
when a statute declares a mandatory rule of conduct." [d. at 540. Professor Plater argues, as 
did the Supreme Court in Hill, that the underlying justification for this proposition is the 
separation of powers of the three branches of government. [d. at 588. The elementary notion 
that Congress writes the laws and the judiciary enforces them (assuming, of course, their 
constitutionality), requires that courts order immediate abatement for statutory violations. 
In these cases, the role of equity is to force the party enjoined to obtain relief from the statute 
in the legislature, rather than to permit the judiciary to re-write statutes through an equitable 
balancing process. [d. at 583-88. 
The first and third segments of the equitable balancing process-threshold balancing and 
discretion in fashioning remedies, respectively-remain relatively untouched by statutory 
commands, according to Plater. This is less true in the decision to fashion remedies, however, 
where "'remedies are to be tailored to achieve statutory compliance, not punishment,' id. at 
564, citing Walling v. Clinchfield Coal Corp. 159 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1946) and '[tlhe court 
... has a heavy responsibility to tailor the remedy to the particular facts of each case so as 
to best effectuate the remedial objectives'" of the statute. [d. at 564, citing Gilbertville 
Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 130 (1965). 
251 Hill, 437 U.S. at 195. 
252 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 306-07. 
253 [d. at 307-08. 
254 [d. at 320. 
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prompt compliance with the Act. "255 Such relief, the Court pointed 
out, is in the trial court's discretion and mayor may not include an 
injunction.256 As a consequence of this conclusion, the Romero-Bar-
celo Court condoned a continuing statutory violation.257 
The Court justified its conclusions by making two principle argu-
ments. First, the Court recognized that an injunction is an extraor-
dinary equitable remedy that courts have historically used cautiously 
in attempts to balance and reconcile fairly competing claims.258 The 
Court stated that this judicial caution should become more pro-
nounced when issuing an injunction that implicates the public inter-
est.259 Although the Court correctly conceded that Congress could 
"guide or control the exercise of the court's discretion,"26o the Su-
preme Court would assume a lack of restrictions on their adjudica-
tory powers absent a clear legislative command indicating other-
wise.261 
The second principle argument the Court made to support its 
holding was that the CWA's regulatory scheme, as suggested by its 
terms and legislative history, contemplates that courts will exercise 
their discretion in fashioning remedies.262 As support for this pro-
posal, the Court cited the Act's plan of phased rather than immediate 
256 [d. 
256 [d. 
257 [d. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The facts essential to the analysis here are as follows: 
The United States Navy conducted training exercises off the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, 
during which the Navy bombed targets in the water. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 
663 (D. P.R. 1979). In a suit brought by the government of Puerto Rico and others, the 
district court ruled that the bombing constituted permitless discharges into the waters of the 
United States which violated the CWA, id. at 664, (although they did not "harm" the waters) 
but refused to enjoin the activity, citing primarily national security reasons. [d. at 707-08. 
Instead, the court merely ordered the Navy to obtain a permit as it continued its unlawful 
discharges. [d. 
The First Circuit reversed this part of the district court's order. Brown v. Romero-Barcelo, 
643 F.2d 835, 862 Ost Cir. 1981). Basing its decision on Hill's reasoning, the appeals court 
held that the trial court should not have undertaken a traditional balancing of competing 
interests because Congress, through the CWA, had ordered national priorites. [d. at 861. By 
simply instructing the Navy to apply for a permit, the lower court failed to protect the 
administrative procedure-to obtain a permit prior to discharging pollutants-created by 
Congress. [d. Accordingly, the First Circuit determined that the Navy had "an absolute 
statutory obligation to stop any discharges of pollutants until the permit procedure has been 
followed," whether or not the discharges harmed the aquatic environment. [d. 
258 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312-13. 
259 [d. at 312. Throughout its opinion, the Court referred to the Navy's interests as the 
public interest. Impliedly, the Court did not equate the environmental interests represented 
by the CWA with the public interest. 
260 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313. 
261 [d. 
262 [d. at 316. 
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compliance,263 as well as the alternative methods (other than an 
injunction) of civil fines and criminal sanctions for achieving compli-
ance. 264 This legislative scheme distinguished the Navy's legal pre-
dicament from the one the TVA faced in Hill. In Hill, the language 
and purpose of the Endangered Species Act, not just the fact of a 
statutory violation, compelled the Court to enjoin the project's com-
pletion. 265 Without a comparable legislative directive from the CWA, 
the Court did not feel a similar compulsion to require an injunction 
in the Navy's case. 266 
At first glance, the sweeping language concerning equitable rem-
edies in Romero-Barcelo seems to grant license to courts of equity 
to disregard a statutory scheme under the cloak of equitable balanc-
ing.267 The Romero-Barcelo decision also seems to repudiate the 
rationale in Hill, that a statute passed by Congress necessarily 
circumscribes the equitable balancing process to be performed by 
courts and tips the balance in favor of the interests promoted in the 
statute.268 
For several reasons,269 however, the Romero-Barcelo opinion, ap-
propriately read, supports neither of these propositions. Two main 
263 [d. 
264 [d. at 315. 
265 [d. at 314. 
266 [d. at 319. 
267 Justice Stevens' lone dissent argued precisely this point. He charged that the majority 
had failed to distinguish between cases where the equitable remedy involved competing private 
interests and those which involved the public interest. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 326 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice pointed out that without considering an equitable remedy 
in light of the objectives of the statute, id. at 329-30, the courts may effectively do as they 
please "under the guise of federal common law." [d. at 33l. 
The dissent also maintained that the Court neglected, in public interest cases, the difference 
between situations in which the statutory violator will not continue his violation and those in 
which the violation is likely to recur. [d. at 326. In the latter scenario, the court has issued 
the injunction rather than allow the violation to persist. [d. at 328-29. Both contentions 
advanced in the dissent are discussed more fully in Plater, Equitable Discretion supra note 
250, at 546-62, and Note, Equitable Discretion Under the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act: Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 73, 84-91 (1983) [hereinafter Note, 
Weinberger and Equitable Discretion]. 
268 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 331-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
269 Professor Farber, suggests three reasons why Romero-Barcelo should be read narrowly. 
First, Professor Farber believes the Supreme Court harbored reservations about the trial 
judge's exercise of discretion, which may explain why the Court remanded the case to the 
First Circuit to re-examine the lower court's equitable balancing act. Farber, Equitable 
Discretion, supra note 236, at 525. Second, Professor Farber read Romero-Barcelo in light 
of Hill and City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), both of which narrowed the 
scope of courts' traditional equitable discreticn. [d. Third, Professor Farber contends that use 
of broad powers of equitable discretion would contravene the congressional intent expressed 
in the Act and its legislative history. [d. at 526. Professor Farber theorized that if Romero-
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points compel this conclusion. First, the Court based its decision on 
an unusual fact foundation. With the Department of Defense as a 
defendant, the Supreme Court, like the district court, viewed an 
injunction that would stop naval training exercises as a threat to 
national security.270 Given this assumption, the Court believed it 
very unlikely that a CWA permit to conduct the exercise would not 
issue. 271 Second, and most important, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that compliance with the statutory scheme was extremely 
important. If the permit were denied and the Navy remained out of 
compliance with the CW A, "the statutory scheme and purpose would 
require the court to reconsider the balance it has struck. "272 Conse-
quently, a court's discretion to refuse to enjoin a violation of the 
CWA is limited in scope. 273 It does not have the authority, equitable 
or otherwise, to allow a statutory violation to continue unchecked 
indefinitely. Instead, a court must act to ensure prompt compliance 
with the CWA.274 
The Romero-Barcelo Court also cited cases indicating that it was 
not oblivious to the limits that statutes may impose on the historical 
process of balancing competing claims. For instance, the Court relied 
significantly on Hecht Co. v. Bowles,275 in part for the proposition 
that equity courts' '''traditional practices"'276 are "'conditioned by the 
necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to pro-
tect."'277 The Court additionally noted that unless a statute ex-
Barcelo is given a narrow reading, the Supreme Court's opinions concerning equitable discre-
tion form a consistent pattern of placing "primary emphasis on vindication of the congressional 
scheme. " [d. 
A fourth reason to give the opinion a narrow interpretation is that the Court decided the 
case incorrectly. For an analysis of this thesis, see Note, Weinberger and Equitable Discretion, 
supra note 267, at 84-94; Note, Weinberger v. Barcelo-Romero: Equitable Discretion and the 
Enforcement of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 347, 
357-61 (1984). 
270 Barcelo-Romero, 456 U.S. at 310. Why the two courts made this assumption is unclear. 
The CWA specifically applies to all federal agencies and provides a specific exception for 
defense-related activities only if the President has made a finding that such an exception is in 
the paramount interest of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982). 
271 [d. at 320. 
272 [d. In fact, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico denied the Navy the water quality permit 
necessary to the issuance of a CWA permit. United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
551 F. Supp. 864, 865 (D. P.R. 1982), aff'd, 721 F.2d 832 (1st Cir. 1983). 
273 Unfortunately, the Court in Romero-Barcelo did not define the extent of a court's dis-
cretion in designing a remedy for CWA violations. Farber, Equitable Discretion, supra note 
236, at 524. 
274 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320. 
275 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
276 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320, citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 330. 
277 [d. Of course, the Court confused the public interest represented by the statute with 
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pressly, or by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the 
court's equitable jurisdiction, the court should recognize and apply 
the full scope of that jurisdiction.278 The Supreme Court in Romero-
Barcelo did not recognize, however, that the CWA does create nec-
essary and inescapable inferences that limit the courts' discretion 
by, for example, establishing a flat ban on the discharge of pollutants 
without a permit. The CW A's legislative history also supports the 
notion of limitations on a court's equitable balancing. 279 Far from 
demonstrating an intent to restrict the meaning of the Hill case, the 
Romero-Barcelo Court cited specific language from previous cases 
that endorsed Hill's principal proposition.280 The Romero-Barcelo 
Court simply did not apply this language appropriately in this in-
stance. 
Both the Hill and Romero-Barcelo decisions have great signifi-
cance for an assessment of the Weisman standards. In each case the 
Supreme Court emphasized that appropriate remedial balancing un-
der environmental statutes must vindicate statutory schemes and 
purposes.281 In Hill, the Court came to this conclusion as a result of 
separation of powers analysis. The Court stressed that as long as a 
statute was constitutional, the courts were bound to follow congres-
sional directives. 282 In Romero-Barcelo, the Court reinforced the 
idea that equitable remedies must achieve congressional and statu-
tory objectives.283 In the section 404 context, this theme of vindicat-
the alleged public interest represented by the Navy's activities. See also Note, Weinberger 
and Equitable Discretion, supra note 267, at 86 (the public interest was the effort to clean 
up the nation's waters, not the Navy's operations). 
278 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313. The Court went on to say that equity principles should 
not yield to light inferences. I d. 
279 The Senate Report commented that "[elnforcement of violations ... should be based on 
relatively narrow fact situations requiring a minimum of discretionary decision making or 
delay" situations requiring a minimum of discretionary decision making or delay" S. REP. No. 
414, 92nd Cong, 1st Sess. 64, 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668,3730 and that "the 
issue before the courts would be a factual one of whether there had been compliance." S. 
REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 80, 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668,3746. 
280 Some lower courts, in the preliminary injuction context, have taken the position that the 
overarching public interest embodied in the CW A required enjoining preliminarily § 404 
violators. See, e.g., United States V. Lofgren, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 20164,20165 
(November 30, 1982) (court's "discretion should be exercised with flexibility and with sensi-
tivity to the large public interest at play when an administrative agency requests an injunction 
in aid of its enforcement of the law"); United States V. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 498 n.12 
(D. N.J. 1984) ("Inherent in the statute itself is the legislative conclusion that violations of it 
cause irreparable injury to the public"). 
281 Farber, Equitable Discretion, supra note 236, at 526. 
282 Hill, 437 U.S. at 195. 
283 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320. 
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ing congressional and statutory interests requires that the Weisman 
test be revised. A synthesis of certain statutory and case law prin-
ciples should make the Weisman test more appropriately reflect the 
congressional determination of the public interest. 
VI. A SYNTHESIS OF ApPROPRIATE CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
REMEDIAL BALANCING UNDER SECTION 404 
A synthesis of the cases in which courts have considered whether 
to order restoration provides several considerations that should fea-
ture prominently in any decision concerning how to remedy section 
404 violations.284 Most of these considerations have their roots in the 
CWA itself. They include: 1) preliminarily, deferring to the govern-
ment's decision to prosecute by deciding the restoration issue, not 
by returning the case to the agency for further administrative action; 
2) creating a remedy that will confer maximum environmental ben-
efits; 3) examining violations with a view towards vindicating sta-
tutory purposes and the public interest; and 4) designing a remedy 
that is likely to deter future violators. Once the court addresses each 
of these elements, it may then examine the equitable factors that a 
defendant may have in its favor. Most defendants undoubtedly will 
be hard pressed to overcome the determinants on the side of resto-
ration. 
As a preliminary matter, numerous lawsuits since Congress 
enacted the FWPCAA in 1972 have clarified many of the ini-
tially vexing interpretation problems posed by the new statute and 
section 404 in particular. 285 Section 404 has withstood legal attack 
on its constitutionality,286 the scope of its regulatory jurisdic-
284 Ideally, of course, little equitable balancing would enter into the decision at all. The court 
would merely determine that it had jurisdiction over the site, find the violation, and order 
the property restored to its pre-violation condition. In effect, courts would create a presump-
tive rule in favor of restoration once a statutory violation had been found. Civil penalties 
might also be imposed as an additional deterrent. Some courts seemed to have followed this 
approach. See, e.g., Conrad, 13 Env. L. Rep. at 20532-33; United States v. Lee Wood 
Contracting, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 119, 121 (E.D. Mich. 1981); United States v. Isla Verde 
Investment Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1854, 1855-56 (July 16, 1980). Since, however, 
most courts seem inclined to conduct some balancing of competing interests, courts must give 
full expression to statutory and environmental concerns in the process. 
285 For a general discussion of several of these issues, see Want, Federal Wetlands Law: 
The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
286 The constitutional questions raised by many defendants have centered around four topics: 
takings, void for vagueness, selective prosecution and right to a jury trial. Defendants fre-
quently claim that uncompensated takings occur when the government denies them a permit 
to build upon wetlands. See, e.g., Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1189 (Ct. 
Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (permit denial not an unconstitutional taking 
where plaintiff had previously developed other portions of its property but was denied per-
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tion,287 the definition of both statutory and regulatory terms,288 and 
mission to develop all of it); but cf. 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. 
Va. 1983) (denial of permit constituted an unconstitutional taking where plaintiff's proposal 
would result in no net loss in wetland due to offer to mitigate and the ACOE did not consider 
all relevant factors in decision to deny). Takings claims have infrequently arisen without 
success when courts have ordered restoration. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1166 (restoration 
could not be a taking because it merely returns property to its condition before unauthorized 
filling and defendant offered no evidence to show that restoration would so diminish value of 
land as to amount to taking). Quite often, a defendant's takings claim is simply deemed 
premature. See, e.g., Ciampitti, 615 F. Supp. at 121; United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 
1211 (7th Cir. 1979) (defendant must apply for and be denied permit before takings claim is 
ripe). 
Some parties affected by the CWA have unsuccessfully challenged its constitutionality by 
arguing that the terms of the statute or its regulations are void for vagueness, Bayou Des 
Families Development Corp. v. United States Corps of Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1025, 1039 
(E.D. La. 1982) (neither statute nor regulations are unconstitutionally vague); United States 
v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852,855 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (CWA terms 
navigable waters and waters of United States not void for vagueness as they give fair notice 
of forbidden conduct), or that the government's regulation under § 404 is an invalid exercise 
of the police power under the Commerce Clause. Tull, 769 F.2d at 185, rev'd on other grounds, 
107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987); Bayou Des Familles, 541 F. Supp. at 1039; Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1210 
(government may regulate dredging or filling activities that may affect interstate commerce). 
In general, the defendants' constitutional challenges to these two issues seemed largely 
perfunctory. 
Defendants who have argued that the government unfairly prosecuted their CWA cases 
and thereby deprived them of due process rights have met with little success. United States 
v. City of Fort Pierre, South Dakota, 580 F. Supp. 1036, 1041 (D. S.D. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds, 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984); Bayou Des Familles, 541 F. Supp. at 1040. In the 
absence of allegations of discriminatory prosecution based on impermissible considerations 
such as race, religion, or the prevention of the exercise of a constitutional right, the claim 
will not be considered in depth. United States v. Alleyne, 454 F. Supp. 1164, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978) (court granted evidentiary hearing for allegations of selective enforcement based on 
race). 
In a victory for § 404 defendants on a constitutional issue, the Supreme Court recently held 
that defendants are entitled to a jury trial on the issue of liability for civil penalties, but are 
not entitled to a jury trial for the amount of civil penalty. Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct.1831, 
1839-40 (1987). 
287 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
288 The most prominent controversy over a statutory definition has been the one concerning 
the meaning of navigable waters as used in the CWA. See supra text accompanying notes 57-
68. 
Defendants have also questioned whether their activities constituted discharges of pollutants 
from point sources. Avoyelles Sportmen's League, 473 F. Supp. at 532 (land-clearing equipment 
was point source as it excavated wetland soil and then discharged it back into the land); 
Fleming Plantations, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1706 (marsh buggies and draglines used in 
dredging operation were point sources); but cf. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (1987) (ACOE regulations 
excluding de minimis incidental soil movement occurring during normal dredging operations 
from definition of discharge of dredged material). The breadth of the term pollutant has 
similarly come into dispute. Minnehaha Creek Watershed District v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 
625 (8th Cir. 1979) (pollutant defined broadly and without regard as to whether the discharge 
affects significantly water quality). 
The principal struggle over the regulatory terms has centered on the definition of wetlands. 
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) supra note 2; see 
also Jackson, THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR WETLANDS JURISDICTION: AGENCIES IN A 
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the courts' authority to order restoration.289 Courts have resolved 
these issues, if not finally, at least with sufficient clarity to put 
individuals on notice that a permit may be required for a particular 
project. 
The clarification of issues has had two results: 1) individuals who 
intend to put wetlands to another use can no longer claim as a defense 
ignorance or confusion over the substance of the section;290 and 2) a 
sufficient body of case law has developed on which courts may base 
their decisions to order restoration. This latter result has generated 
both good and bad effects, however. Although courts have required 
restoration in many significant cases, the standards that have 
evolved to determine the appropriateness of that remedy are not 
the best possible ones to promote CWA's environmental values. The 
clarification of issues basic to section 404, however, should make it 
easier to develop a more statutorily and environmentally adequate 
balancing test. 
An initial but essential issue in section 404 enforcement actions is 
the notion of deferring to the government's decision to prosecute a 
case. One commentator has argued that judicial deference to agency 
action is especially appropriate in section 404 cases because of their 
complex mix of law and public policy.291 Once the government initi-
ates a proceeding seeking restoration, the courts should respect that 
decision by deciding that issue, not by returning the problem to the 
MUDDLE, 9 NATIONAL WELANDS NEWSLETTER No.5, 7-9 (Sept.-Oct. 1987) (agencies should 
regulate isolated wetlands without determining connection to interstate commerce). 
289 See supra text accompanying notes 83-117. 
200 The applicability of the permitting process for a construction project has not always been 
so clear. In an RHA case where restoration was ordered, the defendant complained that the 
remedy unfairly punished him as the ACOE had not objected to or had approved similar 
projects in the recent past. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc. 478 F.2d 418, 431 n.47 
(5th Cir. 1973). The court observed that the defendant's complaint: 
throws in a sharp conflict the claim of equal protection-or perhaps more accurately 
an equal right to violate the law-a sometime facet of equal protection which is today 
a very appealing claim, on the one hand, and the incessant demand from environ-
mentalists that what has gone on in the past can no longer be tolerated and the time 
has come to start cleaning up no matter how much it hurts, on the other. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
As the CWA has been on the books since 1972, the defendant's complaint in Moretti, supra, 
is not a viable one today. Moreover, since § 404 in particular and wetlands in general have 
received great attention in Congress, it is at least arguable that most Americans would 
recognize that destruction or construction activity on wetlands could involve the federal 
regulatory process. 
291 Habicht, Implementing Section 404: The View From the Justice Department, 16 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10073, 10077 (March, 1986) [hereinafter "Habicht, Justice Depart-
ment View]. Habicht's comments primarily referred to judicial review of ACOE decisions 
pertaining to permit issuance, but they would appear to be equally applicable to the choice to 
litigate. 
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ACOE. The district court in Cumberland Farms employed such 
reasoning in deciding to order restoration, rather than to require 
additional administrative proceedings.292 The court felt that a deter-
mination not to resolve the question presented would produce little 
m0re than delay and would constitute an abdication of its responsi-
bilities. 293 When the ACOE has chosen to enforce the law through 
court action, the court owes a "great deal of deference" to that 
manner of proceeding.294 Merely ordering statutory violators to re-
turn to the ACOE to submit, for example, an after-the-fact permit 
is inadequate when restoration is requested. 
Any equitable balancing process involving section 404 must confer 
maximum environmental benefits for the wetlands site at issue. 295 
This criterion appropriately serves the environmental purposes of 
the CWA and promotes the stated intent of Congress-to restore 
and maintain the nation's waters in their natural condition. The 
standard also presents an absolute goal that the court must strive 
to meet in fashioning relief for section 404 violation. As the court in 
United States v. Weisman noted: "The intricate web of interdepend-
ence which characterizes our environment requires that we look 
beyond the present and immediate in assessing the value of any 
particular element of the environment or in gauging the harm that 
will accrue from its destruction. "296 Conferring maximum environ-
mental benefits takes stock of the environment's "intricate web of 
interdependence" and seeks to preserve that web to the fullest ex-
tent possible. 
Another component of an appropriate section 404 balancing pro-
cess requires courts to view violations so as to vindicate statutory 
purposes and the public interest embodied in the statute. 297 This 
means that courts cannot engage in a traditional balancing of com-
peting claims but must instead take into account the legislative 
determination that statutory violations contravene public policy. 298 
The federal courts have the responsibility to enforce the legislative 
29" Cumberland Farms. No. 85-0846-Y slip op. at 3 (referred to in 647 F. Supp. at 1168 
n.1); cf. United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814,817 (9th Cir. 1986) (restoration request denied 
but defendant ordered to seek permits for farming-related activities). 
293 Cumberland Farms, No. 85-846-Y, slip op. at 3. 
294Id. Deference is especially appropriate because the ACOE regulations provide many 
opportunities to negotiate resolutions to wetlands problems without resorting to litigation. 
""5 This factor is discussed in greater depth in the text accompanying notes 125-41, supra. 
296 Weis'man, 489 F. Supp. at 1346; see also Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. at 1182; 
Carter, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20309. 
297 See supra text accompanying notes 231-83 for a more detailed discussion of equitable 
discretion and the statutorily-embodied public interest. 
298 United States V. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 498 n.12 (D. N.J. 1984). 
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policies and programs which the Congress has established and prior-
itized for the nation. 299 In section 404 enforcement proceedings, this 
judicial responsibility requires courts to give great weight to the 
national policy in favor of restoring the nation's waters to their 
natural condition when considering appropriate remedies for statu-
tory violations. 
An examination of the legislative intent and purposes of the CWA 
should play an important part in vindicating the public interest when 
deciding whether to order restoration. In fact, such considerations 
have been persuasive for a number of courts that ultimately ordered 
restoration. The Massachusetts district court in United States v. 
Cumberland Farms was most explicit about the importance of the 
intent and purpose of the statute in ordering restoration. The court 
stated: 
What tips the balance in this case are two factors. First, it seems 
clear to me that the controlling law favors the retention of wet-
lands which have been adversely affected without a permit con-
trary to law. That is to say, it seems to me that it is the legislative 
determination, that unless the balance cuts significantly against 
a restoration of the environment to the status that it enjoyed 
when the legislation with respect to this land took effect in 1977, 
that restoration ought to be ordered. 300 
The Cumberland Farms court went on to state that because of the 
legislative intent, restoration of the wetlands was in the public and 
national interest. 301 
Other courts have found the CWA's legislative intent controlling 
in ordering restoration. For example, in Fleming Plantations, the 
defendants' activities had destroyed more than one hundred acres of 
wetlands. 302 The federal district court instructed the defendants to 
restore the wetlands because the adverse environmental results that 
the defendants caused were contrary to United States policy under 
the FWPCAA.303 Similarly, the court in Weisman overcame its temp-
tation to allow the defendant to keep his unlawfully built road be-
cause to do so would undermine the CWA's stated purpose of re-
storing and maintaining the nation's waters in their natural 
299 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
300 Cumberland Farms, No. 85-0846-Y slip op. at 12 (referred to in 647 F. Supp. at 1168 
n.l). The second factor which the court found relevant was the practicability of achieving 
restoration of the site. I d. at 13. 
301 Id. at 12. 
302 Fleming Plantations, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1709. 
3031d. 
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condition. 304 Decisions such as these demonstrate that the legislative 
intent of the CWA should be a powerful component of any equitable 
balancing in favor of restoration. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's interpretation in Romero-Barcelo 
of the CWA's enforcement provisions virtually compels the use of 
restoration as a remedy for section 404 violations. In that case, the 
Court said that district courts must act to secure "prompt compli-
ance" with the CW A. 305 Because each day unauthorized dredged or 
fill material remains in a wetland is one day of violation of section 
404,306 restoration may be the only way to achieve prompt compliance 
with that section. 307 In sum, by considering congressional policy, 
legislative intent, and securing prompt compliance with the CWA 
when deciding whether to order restoration for section 404 viola-
tions, courts will vindicate more effectively the Act's statutory pur-
poses and the public interest. 
Finally, the concept of deterring future violators should represent 
a significant element of a statutorily effective balancing test. Strict 
enforcement of section 404 through the imposition of restoration 
orders and stiff civil penalties would likely have a salutary deterrent 
effect on potential violators. The Supreme Court in Romero-Barcelo 
recognized that the purpose of an injunction is to deter improper 
behavior. 308 In fact, however, a main failure of current equitable 
balancing decisions is the lack of specific language concerning the 
importance of deterring through restoration those who might violate 
section 404 in the future. Some courts, however, have sent the 
message to future violators implicitly by stating that they could not 
allow defendants to profit from their illegal activities,309 or that the 
public interest warrants strict enforcement of the CWA to clean up 
the nation's waters. 310 The courts, however, should deliver the mes-
sage more clearly. 
304 Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1349. 
305 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320. 
306 United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 700 (D. N.J. 1987); Cumberland Farms, 
647 F. Supp. at 1183. 
307 See United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204, 1215 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (restoration 
ordered to achieve compliance with the CWA). In some cases, restoration may be impossible 
to order because the statutory violator has conveyed the filled-in wetland to innocent third 
parties. See, e.g., Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. at 699-700. 
308 Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 310. 
309 Tull, 615 F. Supp. at 626-27 (court would not look favorably upon defendant's failure to 
aPlily for permit or to abide by ACOE cease and desist order; court therefore ordered 
restoration and civil penalties). 
310 Akers, 785 F.2d at 823; Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. at 499. 
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The concept of deterrence has important effects for a balancing of 
the equities in section 404 cases for several reasons. The issuance of 
civil penalties alone may allow future wetlands developers to include 
such potential penalties as a cost of doing business. Restoration, 
conversely, minimizes the incentive to conduct this type of business 
planning by removing the ability to profit from illegally filled-in 
wetlands. Restoration orders thus may deter future violators and 
thereby enhance the credibility of section 404 enforcement. 
In addition, because the statute sets as a goal the eventual elim-
ination of all pollutant discharges into the nation's waters, consid-
eration of the deterrent value of restoration, combined with strong 
civil penalties, will help to promote that objective. Finally, deter-
rence may also serve as justification for courts to issue a mandatory 
injunction. Courts should reason that deterrence, when viewed in 
conjunction with the statute's intent and its strict liability standard, 
will help to justify the imposition of a relatively harsh remedy. 
Appropriate consideration of these elements-deferring to the 
agency decision to prosecute, conferring maximum environmental 
benefits, vindicating the statutory scheme and the public interest, 
and deterring future violators-will lead to a more environmentally 
principled reading of the CWA. As the CWA nears the end of its 
second decade, it is as important as ever that courts bear in mind 
the ultimate purposes of the Act, that is, the restoration and main-
tenance of the country's waters to their natural condition. An equi-
table balancing process that weighs these factors will help to give 
appropriate attention to the statutory concerns and public interest 
that Congress expressed in the CW A. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The federal government has used section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act as its primary method for protecting the nation's wetlands. One 
of the ways in which the government has been enforcing the statu-
tory prohibition against the unauthorized discharge of dredge or fill 
materials is to request that courts order restoration of sites approx-
imately to their natural condition. In deciding whether to order 
restoration, courts have frequently utilized a traditional equitable 
balancing process. In particular, many courts have adopted the three 
principle standards articulated in United States v. Weisman to de-
termine the appropriateness of the restoration remedy. The Weis-
man test instructs courts to impose restoration if the plan: 1) confers 
maximum environmental benefits; 2) is feasible as a practical matter; 
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and 3) bears an equitable relationship to the degree and kind of 
wrong intended to be remedied by the proposal. 311 Courts have not 
used these standards, however, to promote the environmental pur-
poses and objectives of the CWA as effectively as possible. 312 The 
Weisman requirements provide courts with too much discretion to 
create orders that undermine the attempt to confer maximum en-
vironmental benefits. 313 Too frequently, courts have exercised their 
discretion in precisely this fashion. 
The objective of any equitable balancing process involved in sec-
tion 404 violation cases should be to effectuate an environmentally 
principled reading of that section and the statute as a whole. To 
further that end, courts should discuss explicitly several issues that 
should tend to tip the balance in favor of ordering restoration of 
unlawfully destroyed wetlands. These considerations inclEde defer-
ring to the government to prosecute by not remanding the issue to 
the agency,314 conferring maximum environmental benefits,315 rem-
edying the violation so as to vindicate statutory purposes and the 
public interest,316 and designing a remedy that promotes the concept 
of deterrence. 317 If courts give proper attention to these elements, 
courts will promote more substantially the environmental purposes 
of the Act. 
311 Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1342-43. 
312 See supra text accompanying notes 122-93. 
313 See supra text accompanying notes 194-230. 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 291-94. 
315 See supra text accompanying notes 295-96. 
316 See supra text accompanying notes 297-307. 
317 See supra text accompanying notes 308-10. 
